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The Armored Systems Modernization (ASM) Program's
acquisition environment directly contributed to and was the
principal cause of major program modifications and
revisions. Determination of the factors that produces
program changes and an understanding of their impact provide
the basis for important insights and add to acquisition
manager's body of knowledge.
This thesis develops a composite summary of the ASM
Program, determines the significant acquisition related
environmental factors that affected it, and explains how
these influences altered ASM Program outcomes. Based upon
the historical research and analysis, lessons learned
applicable to Army acquisition programs in general are
provided. Key lessons learned indicate that periodic
programmatic reassessment of both internal and external
environmental factors should be conducted to ensure that.
programs are aligned with valid justifications and have the
support necessary for approval. Acquisition managers also
must receive instruction in the art of political negotiation
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The purpose of this thesis is to develop a composite
summary of the Armored Systems Modernization (ASM) Program,
determine the significant acquisition related environmental
factors that affected it, and explain how these influences
altered ASM Program outcomes. Based upon the historical
research and analysis, lessons learned and insights
applicable to Army acquisition programs in general are
provided.
B. BACKGROUND
The ASM Program represented the Army's modernization
master plan for its combined arms combat systems. The
principal goal of ASM was to significantly increase force
effectiveness through the synergistic impact achieved by
employing an armored "family" of vehicles. The vehicle
family was based upon innovative, non-traditional, leading-
edge design and development concepts and was to be produced
using a tailored acquisition strategy. This fleet of
vehicles was expected to result in substantial cost savings,
programmatic economies, and organizational efficiencies.
Due to program changes precipitated by a fluctuating
acquisition environment, ASM was totally restructured,
negating many of its stated advantages and benefits.
1
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES
This thesis research topic developed through discussions
with the Program Executive Office(r) (PEO) , Armored Systems
Modernization (PEO-ASM). PEO-ASM expressed an interest in
the compilation of key defining elements in the ASM Program
experience, indicating that it would provide them with a
useful resource and reference. During the discussions, PEO-
ASM observed that ASM's acquisition environment directly
contributed to and was the primary cause behind program
modifications and revisions. The PEO believed that
determination of the specific factors causing the changes
and an understanding of their impact upon ASM would yield
important insights and lessons learned which could then be
applied to future Army acquisition programs.
To achieve these objectives, this thesis has constructed
a historical summary of the ASM Program, from its origins in
the pre-ASM studies through the major restructuring efforts
conducted in late 1991. The thesis has also identified the
major acquisition related environmental factors affecting
the program and proposes a set of lessons learned which are
applicable to Army program management in general.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. primary Research Question
Based on a historical summary of the ASM Program,
what common lessons learned can be derived from an analysis
2
of acquisition related environmental factors over the life
of the program?
2. Subsidiary Research Questions
A. What principal and ancillary events and activities
contributed to the inception and evolution of ASM from
late 1979 through the December 1991?
B. Identify the major acquisition related environmental
factors that resulted in modifications and revisions
to ASM Program strategy and planning?
c. What affect did these major factors have on ASM
outcomes?
D. What insights and lessons learned, applicable to
Army acquisition programs in general, can be
derived from the affects of the acquisition
environment on ASM?
E. RESEARCH SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The history of ASM has been marked by complex
interactions between the unmistakable influences of the
acquisition environment and the program's strategy. This
thesis is primarily concerned with those acquisition related
environmental factors which have resulted in the alteration
of the program's original and subsequent strategies. Those
environmental factors not significantly related to major ASM
revisions will not be covered.
Various aspects of ASM programmatics, threat
assessments, and other associated factors were based on
restricted or classified data. In order to maintain an
unclassified thesis, specific restricted and/or classified
decision criteria are not discussed. Additionally, some
documents that might have provided additional insights into
3
program decisions were not available due to limited
distribution and/or the nature of their security
classification.
Finally, this thesis does not represent any official
position of Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD), or the Department of the Army (DA). The information
and data presented represents the author's observations,
interpretations, and conclusions. No inferences, either pro
or con, should be drawn or attributed to any of the agencies
mentioned.
F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research for this topic consisted primarily of an in-
depth literature review and interviews with DA civilian and
military personnel. The literature review included pre-AFV
studies and reports, DA and OSD AFV/Heavy Force
Modernization (HFM)/ASM program documentation, briefing
packets, and memoranda. Congressional Appropriations, Armed
Services and Budget Committee hearing records and reports,
General Accounting Office (GAO) reports, professional
journal articles, and other pertinent written materials were
also referenced.
Research travel was conducted to PEO-ASM (in Warren,
Michigan), and to the offices of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations and Training (DCSOPS), and the Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and
Acquisition (ASARDA) (at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.) for
4
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II., ARMORED SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM -
HISTORICAL SUMMARY
A. GENERAL
Three successive efforts (Figure 1) comprised the
overall Armored Systems Modernizati9n (ASM) Program. ASM
consisted of the Armored Family of Vehicles Task Force
(AFVTF), the Heavy Force Modernization (HFM) Program, and
the ASM Acquisition Program.
The historical summary of the ASM Program is divided
into two segments. The first segment, beginning, in late
1979, reviews the inception and evolution of ASM concepts
and baselines. It primarily discusses the Phase I and II,
AFVTF efforts. The second segment, beginning in January
1988, reviews the transition to the HFM Program, the
conversion to the ASM Acquisition Program, and sUbsequent
development through December 1991.
B. EVOLUTION OF THE ARMORED FAMILY OF VEHICLES CONCEPT
(1979-1988)
This first segment encompasses the formulation and
development of the Armored Family of Vehicles (AFV) concept.
The AFV effort involved detailed research, analysis, and
mandated the start of the complicated program planning and
milestone review, documentation process. The AFV concept
work involved a substantial investment of time, talent, and
6
I ilEAVY FORCE MOUEltNIZATION
........
Figure 1. Task Force/Program Letterheads
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effort by the Army's research, development, and acquisition
(RD&A) and force development communities.
Initial efforts were primarily conducted by the AFVTF
but the assistance of other Army commands, most notably the
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Tank and
Automotive Command (TACOM), and the Army Material Command
(AMC), were instrumental in achieving an acceptable AFV
concept. AFVTF's collaboration with the AirLand Battle -
Future study groups and the Armor/Anti-Armor Special Study
Group were also vital to realizing the approved concept.
The efforts of organizations committed to the AFV
concept definition process were regularly guided by a series
of reviews during the Phase II studies. These concept
reviews were attended by senior Army leaders and staff who
introduced their thoughts, ideas, and concerns into the
process. These reviews helped to direct the work of the
task force and establish AFV concept parameters. When the
approved AFV concept transitioned to program status, it was
based on the corporate consensus of the senior Army
leadership and had wide support across the Army. Throughout
this first segment, ASM remained largely untouched by the
pressures and stresses of the external acquisition
environment (Table I).
8
Table I - Event Timeline (1979-1989)
• 1979-85 - Related group studies;
• OCT 1985 CSA charters AFV effort; draft 0&0 plan;
• JAN 1986 - AFVTF established and Phase I studies begin
(with an unconstrained, revolutionary focus);
• AUG 1986 - AFV JMNS and Milestone 0 approval;
• SEP 1986 - Phase I industry contracts awarded;
• AUG 1987 - Phase I brief-out and AFVTF Phase II
authorized;
• SEP 1987 - AFVTF charter updated and Phase II studies
begin (with a constrained, evolutionary focus),
ALB-F(H) studies begin;
• OCT 1987 - ALB-F studies begin;
• NOV 1987 - 1st RRC (memorandum in lieu of meeting),
• JAN 1988 - AFV RD&A funding reduced (held in Tech Base) ;
• FEB 1988 - 2nd RRC;
• MAR 1988 - FMSWG meeting, A3STF studies begin;
• APR 1988 - 3rd RRC;
• MAY 1988 - TRADoe redefines Package I;
• JUN 1988 - AFVTF/A3STF collaboration;
• AUG 1988 - 4th RRC and Tank Review program;
• SEP 1988 - 5th RRC and AFV decision review;
• OCT 1988 - CSC AFV strategy review;
• NOV 1988 - Phase II industry Contracts awarded;
• JAN 1989 - AFVTF/HFM transition begins;
• APR 1989 - AFVTF Phase II ends, HFM program begins.
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1. Early Conceptual studies (1979-1984)
The current ASM acquisition program is the direct
descendant of a series of related Army analytical research
and study efforts which began in late 1979 and continued
through 1985 (Table II). The focus of this group of related
studies was primarily to determine Army operational
shortcomings and armored, ground combat system deficiencies.
The objective of these studies was to evaluate and determine
operational and organizational solutions and strategies for
correcting the problems.
Table II - Related study Groups
study Group
• Armored Combat Vehicle Technology (ACVT)
• Future Close Combat Vehicle Study (FCCVS)
• Tank Armament Review Group (TARG)
• Army Tank Program Analysis (ATPA)
• Future Armored Combat System (FACS)
• Special Study Group, Armor (SSGA)
• Armor Investment Strategy (AIS) Group
• Armored Combat Vehicle, Science
Technology (ACVST)
• Platform Modernization Program (PMP)















One central theme that repeatedly received the
attention of these study groups was that of an armored
family of vehicles. Employment of a vehicle family appeared
to resolve many of the shortcomings and weaknesses that were
being assessed in the research. The Army had long
recognized the advantages and utility of planning and
developing a fleet of vehicles that stressed maximum chassis
and component commonality. Although this was not a new
concept, development and procurement of a vehicle family
entailed a major departure from the Army's traditional item-
by-item development process and its "by eaches" approach
(one type of vehicle at .a time) to systems procurement.
This, however, had long been thought unachievable by Army
leaders.
Army leaders and logisticians were also becoming
concerned by the increasing proliferation of major armored
vehicle components. In 1976, the Army's heavy armored force
had
•.. five different armored vehicle chassis (consisting of
hull, suspension, and drivetrain), five different types
of track, three different engines, and four different
transmissions. After ten years of modernization
[(through 1986)], the counts increased to eight
different chassis (with 17 different hull designs),
eight different track designs, five different engines
(with 14 different propulsion system configurations) and










































VEHICLE ENGINE TRANSMISSION TRACK SUSPENSION ELECTRONICS
I CURRENT ·1·
M1A1 TANK AGT-1500 XT-11QO.3B T-158 UNIQUE TORSION UNIQUE
M2A2 BFVS VTA-903 HMPT-5QO.3 T-157 UNIQUE TORSION UNIQUE
M728CEV AV05-179Q-20 CD-85Q-6A T-142 UNIQUE TORSION UNIQUE
M109HOW 8V71T XGT-411 T-136 M109 TORSION UNIQUE
M901 rrv 6VS3T XT-l00 T-130 UNIQUE TORSION UNIQUE
M929 FAASV 8V71T XGT-411 T-136 M109 TORSION UNIQUE
TOTAL 5 5 5 5 5
I .HFMui};",1
BLOCKUI HFM-HEAVY HAl-HEAVY HFM-H HFM-HEAVY SAVA
FJFV V V V V VCMVAFASLOSAT VTA-903 HMPT-500-3 T-157 BFVS TORSIONFARV-A ~ ~ ~ ~
I TOTAL ® ® ® ® CD
.'
...
In addition to the expansion of chassis and automotive
components, other vehicle system components were also
growing; the opportunity to capitalize upon any form of
vehicle system commonality was quickly being lost.
Development of a vehicle family provided the Army
with the chance to reverse this trend. Combined with the
conclusions of the study groups, the concerns of the
logisticians helped the notion of system commonality and the
family of vehicles gain favor within Army combat development
and the RD&A communities.
a. Special Study Group, Armor
In 1984, the Special Study Group, Armor (SSGA)
reached the conclusion that it would be sUbstantially more
cost effective to combine vehicles into a common family
rather than field unique systems. SSGA maintained that the
item-by-item process resulted in a "stovepiped" (Figure 3)
development process and didn't lend itself to future across-
the-force (total force) requirements. In the stovepipe
process, individual systems were planned from the bottom-up
rather than using a top-down approach. This bottom-up
method integrated an already existing baseline chassis with
a specific mission module. While this method resulted in
the rapid development and fielding of required systems, the
design based trade-offs inherent in this process frequently
yielded sub-optimized systems. The operational
13
Figure 3. "stovepiped" Acquisition Process
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•
effectiveness of these vehicles was often considered to be
marginal by their commanders and crews.
The baseline chassis for the Ml13, Personnel
Carrier provides an example of the bottom-up approach.
Various types of mission module packages have been adapted
to this chassis and produced over the last 25 years.
Vehicles such as the M577 Command Carrier, the M548
Ammunition Carrier, the M901 Improved Tow Vehicle, and the
M106 Mortar Carrier incorporate a number of design trade-
offs,which resulted from the bottom-up approach to
development of these systems.
The SSGA study concluded that " ... the Army's top
leadership must demand common solutions from [its]
developers [Ref. 2]". The " ... success of [a] family of
vehicles concept depends upon ••. [an] emphasis on common
rather than unique solutions [Ref. 3]".
b. Defense Science Board
In 1985, the Defense Science Board's (DSB)
Armor/Anti-Armor Study arrived at conclusions, regarding the
Army's need to upgrade u.S. armored capabilities, that were
similar to those of the previous studies. In commenting
upon the status of Army combat system development and
procurement, the DSB expressed that "U.S. ability to convert
R&D to fielded systems lags [behind] Soviet performance by a
wide margin .... [Ref. 4]" " ... fault for this
situation must be laid at the feet of the Services, OSD
15
[(Office of the Secretary of Defense)], and the
Congress .••• for each in its [own] unique way has contributed
to the problem [Ref. 5]". commenting on the
Army's inability to mount a credible response to ongoing
soviet modernization efforts, the DSB concluded that
" ••• because we lack a coordinated focus, we are unable to
realize the [battlefield] synergism which could be
ours •••• [Ref. 6]". The DSB concluded thc..t future
system acquisition should be proactive not reactive. IIWe
need to catch up in [our operational] capabilities by
bringing into being and fielding systems that will match the
expected threat .... not the fielded threat."
[Ref. 7]
In their final report, DSB recommended that the
Army " ••• initiate [the] development of an operational
concept and requirements for a family of heavy, close-combat
"
vehicles oriented around a future u.s. tank .•. "
[Ref. 8]. "The design objectives [for the vehicle
family] are to reduce operating and support costs by
maximizing commonality... [Ref. 9]". Finally, the
DSB " ... strongly recommend[s] that the Chief of Staff of the
Army charter a Task Force to develop [the] operational
requirements and concepts for a future ... family
of ... vehicles .. ". [Ref. 10]
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2. Threat Assessment and Trends (1979-1988)
Since the late 1970s, intelligence sources warned
. that Soviet modernization of conventional, land based
systems was rapidly eroding the scientific and technological
superiority held by u.S. weapon systems. For years, U.S.
technological superiority had provided a substantial counter
to Soviet political and military aspirations but
sophisticated threat weapon systems were beginning to be
designed, developed, produced, and fielded in increasing
numbers. Analysts studying Soviet armored vehicle
technology and production capabilities cautioned that the
numerically superior Soviets were quickly narrowing the
quality gap (~evel of capability) between their systems and
those of the u.S. The rate of technological closure caused
some sources to speculate that the Soviets would achieve
parity and possibly move ahead of the u.S. in certain
critical armored vehicle technologies by the end of the 20th
century. In the early 1980s, intelligence reports indicated
that the Soviet Uniori was rapidly narrowing the qualitative
lead that the U.S. had long held in science and technology
(Figure 4) .
a. soviet Military Modernization
A persistent Soviet military build~up, guided by
national priorities, strategic objectives, and operational
concepts, had continued unabated since the 1950s. Emerging



































Figure 4. Narrowing of the uS-soviet Quality Gap - Projected
.
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would be characterized by rapid and continuous maneuver,
conducted over constantly changing battlefields .•.
[Ref. 11]" and distinguished by " ..• many combat
penetrations deep into enemy areas of operation ...
[Ref. 12]". soviet doctrine emphasized heavy
reliance on combined arms to achieve and exploit the deep
penetrations into enemy areas of operation. These combined
arms operations, in turn, stressed the use of massive
armored thrusts to achieve these penetrations. soviet
dedication to this highly, maneuver-oriented doctrine is
seen in the large numbers of armored vehicles in soviet
units. "Soviet tank divisions have approximately 328 tanks
and a Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) has approximately 271.
Both include combat and combat support units equipped with a
wide variety of other types of armored vehicles
[Ref. 13]."
Despite political attempts to curb U.S. and
Soviet strategic and conventional forces in the 1980s
(Figure 5), intelligence sources speculated that the Soviet
conventional build-up would continue regardless of u.s. or
NATO strategic reductions. Reports indicated expansion of
combined arms units, increases in equipment quality and
quantity, continued improvements in force command and
control, application of emerging technologies, and a













expected to significantly change the nature of the modern
battlefield. Potential new capabilities included massed
precision artillery fires, development and employment of
directed energy (DE), laser, and microwave weapons,
increased use of electronic warfare, improved reconnaissance
capabilities, and a greater possibility for the use of
offensive and defensive chemical and nuclear weapons.
[Ref. 14]
b. The Tank and soviet operational Doctrine
A principal component of Soviet modernization
has been the steady improvement in design and development of
its armored forces. The Soviets have continued to mechanize
their ground forces since the end of World War II increasing
armored vehicle lethality, survivability, and mobility.
This emphasis on mechanization has succeeded in increasing
the tempo (accelerated pace) of Soviet ground maneuver
warfare.
The centerpiece of the Soviet's highly
maneuverable form of land warfare is the tank. Soviet
support for the tank has remained despite recent debates
over its future viability. The Soviets believe that with
continued scientific and technological development, their
designers can- improve tanks to allow continued operation on
the future battlefield despite the proliferation and
increasing lethality of modern anti-armor weapons.
Commenting on the prominence and role of the tank in future
21
armed conflicts, General V.M. Gordiyenko, Chief of the
Malinovsky Armored Troops Academy, stated in september 1987
that ..... tanks have greater potential to further enhance
their combat efficiency on the basis of the modern
achievements of science and technology. Hence, I believe
that both now and in the future, there is no alternative to
the tank as the leading weapon system of the ground forces".
[Ref. 15]
Intelligence sources in 1985, indicated that
Soviet commitment to the tank as the primary, tactical land
system combined with their vast ground vehicle research and
development (R&D) organization, would probably lead to a
succession of new, highly capable tanks and infantry
fighting vehicles over the next two decades. Projections
for Soviet armored vehicle design, development, and
fielding, through the year 2005, indicated that the tank
would remain the key component of armored shock and
firepower although the wide use of other specialized armored
vehicles would continue. Additionally, while modernization
efforts would primarily upgrade current and older armored
vehicles with advanced characteristics in the near to mid-
term, periodic revolutionary tank design developments would
compliment the standard evolutionary tank improvements
[Ref. 16].
Soviet tank analysis concluded that the
development cycle for upgrading systems with advanced
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capabilities averaged five years with about ten years
required to design and deploy vehicles with major
technological changes using emerging technologies. Both
development cycles were notably faster than u.s.
development. Modernized soviet vehicles containing
offensive and defensive upgrades threaten the ability of
u.s. weapons to defeat them. [Ref. 17]
Of particular concern to the u.s. military was
the next series of future Soviet tanks (FST). These were
presumed to be revolutionary in design. FST I and II were
projected to be fielded in the 1990s and FST II and III were
expected to have significantly improved capabilities. Many
within the Army expressed serious doubts that u.s. Ml or
MIAI tanks would be able to defeat or withstand the
anticipated soviet FST II or III tanks. The threat of the
FST tanks produced serious concern within the Army, OSD and
Congress accelerating calls for the total modernization of
all u.s. armored forces.
3. Armored Family of Vehicles Task Force (1986-1988)
By late 1985, Congressional and Department of
Defense (DOD) concerns could be characterized by
apprehension over soviet modernization efforts, soviet
qualitative advances, and the FST series tanks.
Additionally, OSD was grappling with a decline in defense
funds and the Army was troubled by rising operations and
support (O&S) costs and decreasing budgets. Nevertheless,
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in response to the Soviets, the complete modernization of
all u.S. armored forces was strongly advised as a counter to
" ••• emerging threat capabilities and (to correct] existing
(u.S.] force deficiencies". (Ref. 18] With the
tacit support of Congress and 050, the Army made the
decision to modernize current forces to achieve significant
improvements in vehicle capabilities.
In October 1985, the Chief of Staff of the Army
(CSA) chartered a study effort to plan the total
modernization of the Army's heavy forces. The Armored
Family of Vehicles Task Force was given the mission ..... to
develop and field an armored vehicle fleet, based on
advanced technology and commonality, to defeat the threat of
the late 1990s and beyond .•.• (Ref. 19]". The
AFVTF effort was to be executed in two phases with a
decision to begin Phase II being contingent upon the success
of Phase I.
In concert with the AFVTF charter, a draft,
"umbrella" Operational and Organizational (0&0) plan was
developed prior to the start of task force operations. ~rhe
0&0 plan was written to support technology base research and
development programs leading to the eventual production and
fielding of an AFV and to serve as a guideline for the
development of individual systems in response to current and
future battlefield deficiencies. The 0&0 plan detailed
characteristics of the vehicle family and basic aspects of
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AFV operational employment. The plan also described the
tentative distribution and fielding procedures for the
family. The 0&0 plan specified that vehicles would use
common components, mission specific turrets or modules
(mission modules), and employ a minimum number of chassis.
Commonality was to be optimized throughout the fleet but use
of unique, innovative design characteristics. state-of-the-
art and emerging technologies were also to be stressed
[Ref. 20] (Table III).
The AFV fleet was intended to replace and/or
supplement all existing armored vehicles and most wheeled
vehicles in the Army inventory. In addition, it was to be
fielded in battalion or brigade sets. Present vehicle crew
size, job specialties, and support requirements were also
required to be reduced. Finally, overall design objectives
directed a 40% reduction in total fleet costs.
[Ref. 21]
4. Phase I, Program Development
Phase I task force operations began in January 1986
and were officially scheduled to conclude in August 1987.
Based on the CSA's guidance, the primary objective of Phase
I was to develop a program to accomplish the AFV mission,
secure approval of a Joint Mission Needs statement (JMNS),
and achieve a Milestone 0 (concept exploration and
definition (CE/D» decision. Supplementary Phase I tasks,
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aside from standard programmatic considerations, were to use
Table III - AFV Design Characteristics [Ref. 22]
• Common chassis and components integrated with mission
modules;
• Advanced survivability technologies/techniques;
• Applique and tunable armor;
• External, adjustable suspension systems;
• Human engineering (MANPRINT);
• Preplanned product improv~ments (P3I) engineering;
• Modular components;
• Use of robotics and artificial inte~ligence;
• Common "friend or foe" vehicle signatures;
• Electromagnetic pulse and directed energy weapons
protection;
• Built in diagnostic and prognostic test equipment;
• Common vehicle electronics architecture (vetronics);
• Position location and navigation capabilities;
• Enhanced target acquisition and fire distribution
capabilities;
• Significant system upgrades (e.g. lethality,
survivability, mobility);
• Increase supportability, transportability, and
deployability.
innovative technological approaches, develop abbreviated
acquisition schedules, revise and field AFV within the
principles of a 21st century up-date of the AirLand Battle
(ALB) operational doctrine, and guide the Army toward a
26
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Milestone 1 (demonstration and validation (DEMjVAL»
decision. [Ref. 23]
AFVTF initially consolidated and reviewed the data
generated from the group studies. Using those ideas and
recommendations and the eSA's missions as a baseline,
elementary task force design guidelines stressed commonality
in chassis and system components, a heavy maneuver focus,
concurrent production, and non-traditional acquisition
methods. A first unit equipped (FUE) date of fiscal year
(FY) 1996 was planned. Planning of the AFV was to be
unconstrained and revolutionary [Ref. 24].
a. Desiqn Characteristics
Underlying the planned procurement of new
armored vehicles, AFV represented a significant change in
the way that the Army intended to fight, resupply, train,
man, and equip itself in the 21st century. A principal
objective of AFV research was to attain significant
warfighting improvements and achieve substantial O&S savings
through emphasis on the family approach, commonality, common
components, mission specific modules, and multi-mission
capabilities (Figure 6). A major departure from past design
efforts, AFVTF used a requirements-based vehicle design
process. This process was predicated upon satisfying a
needed battlefield capability (missions and roles) rather
than the more traditional vehicle-based design methods.
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Over 30 family vehicles were designed to fulfill these
battlefield roles (Table IV-A, B, & C).















Combat Gap Crosser (BRDGE)
Combat Mobility Vehicle
Directed Energy Weapons - Vehicle
(DEW)
Future Armored Combat System (Tank.)
Future Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV)
Future Reconnaissance Vehicle (RECON)
Fire Support/Combat Observation, Line of
Sight (FIST)
Line of Sight, Anti-Tank (Kinetic
Energy Missile - Vehicle, LOSAT)




Light, Future Armored Combat System

























Table IV-B - AFV Assault Support Force
Mission Role
Advanced Field Artillery System - Cannon
(HWTZR)
Armored Security Vehicle
Combat Support Smoke Vehicle (Smoke)
Future Armored Rearm Vehicle - Artillery
(REARM)
Future Armored Refuel Vehicle - Fleet
(REFUEL)
General Purpose Carrier (Resupply, MDV)
Maintenance Assistance and Repair System
(MAINT)
Medical Evacuation Vehicle (AMBUL, BNAID)
Mortar Weapons System - Vehicle (MRTR)
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
Reconnaissance System
Table IV-C - AFV Battle Support Force
Mission Role
Elevated Target Acquisition System
Future Command and Control Vehicle
(CMDGRP, C2V)




Non-Line of Sight System - Anti-Tank/Air
Defense (NLOS-AT/AD)









































Figure 6. Family Concept: Common Chassis and Mission
Modules
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The AFV fleet planned to utilize a minimum
number of vehicle chassis and a maximum number of common
system components. Each vehicle was to be based on a heavy,
medium, or light protection chassis according to its mission
and location on the battlefield. systems were SUbsequently
assigned to one of three battlefield echelons: the assault
force, assault support force, or battle support force
(Figure 7). The common vehicle chassis and components were
to be integrated with an individual mission module designed
to optimally perform one or more specific combat tasks or
battlefield functions. When combined with a chassis, these
mission modules, in effect, created an assault (e.g. tank-
like), assault support (e.g. artillery), pr battlefield
support (e.g. rearm/refuel) vehicle as required by Army
combat tables of organization and equipment (TOE). When
employed, the fleet was expected to achieve significant
operational (battlefield) synergy (Figure 8).
Other important AFV design considerations
included maximum use of state-of-the-art components,
incorporation of leap-ahead lethality and survivability
technologies, and engineering the systems for P3I. The
future P31 potential allowed for continued vehicle
performance upgrades as emerging technologies matured. The
plan also envisioned that complete AFV sets would be issued




U 0 <{ ~
co ~ z a:





















rfl ,> @l~~I .u. 0.~ - 0.t----MEl ~i-I~~,~t~I' .Z'-i~r----:-:-1;:
L.J zl I
:::>

























: ~ ~I--~-~-_-_-_~~_._.~C'I~~.i ~




















































































Family Concept: Battlefield Synergy
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achieve large scale, initial operational capability (IOC) in
the minimum time possible. An abbreviated and tailored
design and development cycle was recommended in conjunction
with the Army streamlined acquisition system (ASAP). ASAP
sought to simplify or eliminate system development phases
and it was conceived that vehicles would progress from a
non-hardware proof of principle (POP) configuration, bypass
the OEM/VAL phase, and proceed directly into full scale
development (FSO). Concurrent development ,was also
suggested to capitalize upon the cost reductions associated
with the abbreviated design and development procedure.
Finally, as a result of common components and modular
characteristics, the vehicle family was expected to yield
impressive efficiencies and economies of scale in the areas
of programmatics, manpower, maintenance, logistics, and
training during the families 20 year life cycle.
b. Best Technical Approach
A principal AFVTF requirement was to define and
describe the AFV family vehicles. This was accomplished
through a series of analyses, computer modeling and
simulation exercises reSUlting in a single best technical
approach (BTA) for each individual system. The AFVTF BTA
strategy was based on a technique known as an iterative BTA
cycle. This method had proven successful during its
previous use in the Army's Light Helicopter - Experimental




iterative AFV cycle, separate agencies conducted BTAs
developing a number of different possible approaches for
each vehicle. After a thorough analysis of the BTAs, only
the design that achieved the highest level of optimization
at the lowest cost would be selected for future development .
While not formally completed until AFVTF Phase
II, both AFVTF and the TACOM conducted initial BTAs. The
efforts were largely generic and used to determine
approximate vehicle characteristics, provide data for the
initial Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analyses (COEA),
the Economic Analyses (EA) , and to act as a control group in
comparison against subsequent industry BTA results. Data
generated from these initial BTAs were used to define three
alternative vehicle force sets (Table V). The sets
(Appendix B) were then employed in a number of subsequent
comparative analyses against a simulated future threat to
generate and evaluate the resulting cost and performance
data.
Table V - Generic BTA Alternatives [Ref. 25]
• Base case - a projected 1992 force based on current
equipment and modernized through standard incremental
improvements;
• Alternative #1 - a projected 1996 force consisting of
selected system replacements and/or the introduction of
new systems and modernized through product improved (PIP)
systems and use of non-developmental items (NDI);
• Alternative #2 - the set of AFV vehicles as determined
through the BTA process.
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In simulations, Alternative #2 demonstrated
significant advantages over the Base Case and Alternative
#1. Alternative #2 was not officially endorsed until Phase
II, when more data had been analyzed (Appendix C).
c. Concept Exploration and Definition, Request for
Proposal
A request for proposal (RFP) was issued in
September 1986 with project due date of August 1987. The
RFP solicited contractors for a one-year CE/D study to
determine AFV BTA designs. Five industry consortia
responded to the solicitation (Table VI).
Table VI - Industry Consortia [Ref. 26]
• Armored Vehicle Technologies Associated (AVTA)
• Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) , Ground Systems Division
• General Motors Corporation (GMC) , Military Vehicle
Operations
• PACCAR , Incorporated, Defense Systems Division
• AAI Corporation
Of these, the industry teams of AVTA, TCM, and GMC (Figure
9) received study contracts and became part of the AFV
design and development team (Figure 10). These three teams
remained involved in the ASM efforts through mid-1990.
d. Phase I, Final Report Recommendations
The Draft AFVTF, Phase I report was released in
August 1987 and presented to the Army Requirements Review
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the potential importance of the subsequent decisions, the
RRC meeting was attended by those Army leaders that would
normally be convened for an Army Systems Acquisition Review
Council (ASARC) meeting. The report validated the AFV
design characteristics and parameters and recommended that
AFVTF be continued through Phase II with a subsequent Phase
III effort to convert task force operations to a Program
Office. AFVTF also urged that a detailed required
operational capability «ROC) or operational requirements
document (ORO» be developed [Ref. 27].
e. Requirements Review council Decision
Initial RRC discussions centered primarily on
questions of force affordability and concurrent design,
development, production, and fielding of the 28 vehicles
determined by the task force to be essential to the AFV
family. The CSA concurred with many of the task force
recommendations, instructing that the AFVTF charter be
extended through Phase II. Rather than follow a
revolutionary approach, however, the RRC directed Phase· II
follow a constrained, evolutionary approach. AFV was also
to be integrated into an overall force modernization plan
with the AFV concept integrated with concepts established
for 21st century conflicts. Finally, the CSA directed that
AFV programmatics be developed in detail including finding a
way to support AFV within the Army Program Objectives
Memorandum (POM), and for RRCs to be conducted quarterly to
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guide to progress of the task force [Ref. 28].
Finally, the CSA mandated that a public information program
be developed " ... to ensure that the Army speaks with one
voice •••. [Ref. 29]".
s. AirLand Battle Doctrine Review and Reassessment
(1987)
The umbrella 0&0 plan, developed for Phase I,
contained abbreviated and incomplete discussions of the AFV
missions and roles since no operational concept for AFV
existed and it was unknown how the heavy force would be
expected to fight. Realizing the importance of a clear .AFV.
operational mission and vehicle roles to the design process,
the task force developed its own concept to fill this void.
An understanding of the future battlefield, emerging
technologies, and mission requirements were extremely
important to proper development o~ the AFV concept. This
information had to be developed in the context of Army
AirLand Battle operational doctrine and articulated in
sufficient detail and depth for use by AFVTF and system
proponent material developers. Despite the task force's
initial attempts, AFV missions and roles still lacked
definition. To resolve this problem, AFVTF requested and
subsequently received assistance in constructing a valid
operational concept.
a. AirLand Battle - Future, study Groups
In response to requests by the AFVTF, TRADOC




Group (ALB-F(H) SSG) in. September 1987. The SSG's mission
was to determine how medium and high intensity conflicts
(MIC/HIC) would be conducted from 1989 through 2004,
describe the impact on doctrine, organization, and material,
and design the force using current resource constraints .
Concurrently, the Deputy Chief of Staff for operations
(DCSOPS) directed the Army War college (AWC) to initiate a
study aimed at developing a warfighting concept for heavy
armored forces in the year 2004 [Ref. 30].
In October 1987, TRADOC also directed the
Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity (CACDA) to
develop an all encompassing AirLand Battle Future (ALB-F)
concept" to " .•• describe how the U.S. Army fights joint and
combined Arms operations from the tactical to operational
level within a strategic context to meet its worldwide
commitments. [Ref. 31]"
D. AirLandBattle Studies
The three study groups examined Phase I findings
and maintained a continuous dialogue with AFVTF during Phase
II. To ensure that these studies did not diverge, the Army
administratively linked them together. AWC was directed to
support the ALB-F(H)SSG studies which in-turn supported the
CACDA, ALB-F effort. The close working'relationship between
the AFVTF and ALB-F(H)SSG allowed the AFVTF to provide
direct input into the ALB-F(H) concept development process.
The collaboration between AFVTF and ALB-F(H)SSG resulted in
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warfighting concepts that were highly correlated with the
technological opportunities that were available, allowing
the AFV system concepts to be firmly supported in the new
doctrine.
Mirroring the constrained approach used in Phase
II, operational tenants and principles used in ALB-F
remained evolutionary in nature. continuous guidance and
involvement by Army senior leaders and staff ensured that
doctrinal development and AFV force design and material
development evolved from present organizational structures
and were closely linked with current ALB warfighting
doctrine.
The draft ALB-F studies provided AFVTF with the
information needed to revise the original 0&0 plan, pUblish
the AFV ROC, and ensure that AFV was well coordinated with
and synchronized to the requirements of ALB-F(H) and the
tenants of ALB-F in general. This process created a great
degree of synergy between the new AFV fleet and the future
operational doctrine. The emerging ALB-F(H) doctrine
included the proposed 0&0 plan and the required capabilities
for AFV equipped units. It also added "endurance" (staying
power) as an ALB-F tenant, and advocated that future armored




6. Phase II, Program Development
AFVTF, Phase I officially concluded with an August
1987 briefing to the RRC. Phase II began in September 1987
and was conducted through February 1989. Concerns over the
high cost of developing and fielding the 28 vehicles
proposed by the AFVTF resulted in Phase II's constrained,
evolutionary approach. This approach was devised to refocus
previous AFV efforts into a more acceptable and achievable
program.
The increased emphasis and importance that the CSA
placed on AFV Phase II increased support for the Phase II
efforts. The Department of the Army staff (ARSTAF), most
notably the Deputy Chief of Staff, operations (DCSOPS) and
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research,
Development, and Acquisition (ASARDA) established AFV-
related project/liaison offices in the Major Commands
(MACOM). The commanders of AMC, TRADOC (several school
commands were already acting as system proponents), and
TACOM became closely involved in the Phase II study efforts
(Figure 11).
The CSA up-dated and refocused the AFVTF charter
after the conclusion of Phase I. The primary Phase II
objective was to direct the Army toward achieving a
Milestone I (concept demonstration and validation (DEM/VAL»
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) decision by the 4th quarter









































AFV ANALYSIS KEY PLAYERS
t
Phase I system concepts and characteristics to
affordability, reducing system and force O&S costs,
developing strategies to field AFV, maximizing industry
involvement and competition, and prioritizing the initial
fielding package. [Ref. 33]
a. Requirements Review council (November 1987) and
Concurrent Activities
The guidelines established by the RRC (November
1987 to September 1988) were largely responsible for the
direction of AFV development taken throughout this period.
The first scheduled RRC in November 1987 was canceled due to
scheduling conflicts, however, a message sent to the RRC
members detailed a new proposed Phase II study approach.
This approach was developed in response to concerns over the
Phase I recommendations for accelerated acquisition, near-
term affordability, timeline concerns, and integration risks
between the overall force and AFV. The message requested
and was subsequently approved to slip the AFV timeline to
accommodate a full three year OEM/VAL phase (from FY90
through FY92) and move IOC achievement from FY95 to FY98.
The approach resulted in the development of new timelines
and fielding options that departed from those of Phase I.
These new timelines were necessary since the Phase I
timelines.were out of alignment with the POM building
process. The new timelines helped formulate the FY90 to
FY94 POM and established initial AFV baselines for Phase II.
[Ref. 34]
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Based on the schedule change, new developmental
assumptions were also devised. A key assumption was that a
process of "disciplined evolution" was needed to properly
prioritize the proposed 28 vehicle AFV fleet. This process
dictated that the AFV vehicles also be packaged (force
packaging) into groups by mission/role and chassis for
development. The disciplined evolution approach resulted in
a detailed examination of the entire Army force structure
and future service modernization plans • Additionally, t,his
concept helped blunt attacks that AFV was too radical or not
well thought out. The concept of disciplined evolution was
to affect all following AFVTF activities. Together with the
new timelines, these changes initiated AFVTF's shift from
the Phase I baseline. [Ref. 35]
1. 1987 Funding cut
Responding to a funding shortfall and to
SUbsequent ARSTAF recommendations in December 1987, a
pivotal decision was made to reduce the AFV operating budget
and redirect the balance of AFV funding from within the R&D
science and technology (Tech) base. This action caused
major problems for the AFVTF in the months ahead. While the
funding cut reduced AFV visibility and vulnerability at a
critical time, AFVTF was forced to find funds in other Army
R&D technical and scientific base (Tech Base consisting of
6.1, 6.2, and 6.3A funds) programs. This move also caused
the industry teams to think that the Army not serious about
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the AFV. A great deal of effort had to be expended to keep
industry interested in AFV but an additional year passed
before industry contract funding was made available again.
Congress, sensing a lack of commitment by the Army, canceled
the AFV budget causing additional strain in funding AFVTF
operations.
b. Requirements Review council (February 1988) and
Concurrent Activities
The second RRC meeting was held in February
1988. AFVTF briefed that OSD and Congress were worried that
the AFV concept was not viable and that the budget
reductions had sent mixed signals to various constituencies.
It was also noted that under the heavy force structure, AFV
would be considered a heavy rather than a light force effort
and therefore any consideration of light tank development
had been dropped. Finally, system prioritization through
the disciplined evolution of current and future fleets was
briefed as meeting the CSA's guidance to fit AFV into an
overall force modernization plan.
The disciplined force evolution concept entailed
managing a HI/LO (newer/older) mix of systems in a
continuous cycle of modernization using the current force as
a start-point. It would access new and retire old systems
with a minimum bUdgetary "bow wave", while keeping the
industrial base "warm" for mobilization. [Ref. 36]
The AFV fleet, as envisioned, included different
levels of component, Chassis, and integrated force
47
commonality (Figure 12). Component and chassis commonality
were routine concepts but the notion of integrated force
commonality was new. An integrated force incorporated AFV
hardware development and O&S cost reduction concepts within
the vehicle family. The resulting integrated, common force
coupled with doctrine specifically structured and designed
to capitalize on its enhanced battlefield capabilities was
expected to create a synergistic impact much greater than
its parts.
AFVTF also recommended that a traditional AFV
timeline option be used rather than the accelerated ASAP
proposals from Phase I. This approach was adopted due to
AFVTF sensitivity regarding OSO and Congressional concerns
over the streamlined acquisition proposals. AFVTF support
for the traditional acquisition cycle, however, hindered
ARSTAF acceptance of the AFV concept until the fall 1988.
[Ref. 37] Finally, AFVTF recommended that the RRC
approve the strategy of disciplined evolution. The strategy
consisted of a reduction in the total number of family
vehicles to be initially developed, an incremental force
development concept, definition of an AFV "Package I"
(highest priority systems) and a tentative timeline
(Figure 13). [Ref. 38]
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1. Force Modernization strategy working
Group
Following the AFVTF recommendations, the
CSA expressed the need for program movement and directed
that a draft AFV Package I be presented at the next RRC. In
an attempt to resolve the Package I dilemma, a one-time
meeting of the ad-hoc Force Modernization strategy Working
Group «FMSWG) comprised of key AFVTF, MACOM and ARSTAF
personnel) convened in early March 1988 to prioritize the
list of AFV vehicles and place them into fielding packages.
The working group followed the disciplined evolution theme
and included upgrades to current systems in their decision
process. The working group also determined that a heavy
protection, chassis design would be available for mission
module integration in 1991 but that medium chassis
powertrain and suspension technologies would not be
available until 1994. This resulted in the consideration of
the M2/MLRS chassis to support medium vehicles on an interim
basis. Finally, FMSWG advised that AFV should be turned
over to the institutions regularly constituted to bring new
systems through the developmental process (or management
evolution) to stabilize system development over time.
The FMSWG, AFV prioritization process was
guided by an informal set of principles. The principles
determined that current vehicles should be selectively
modified to counter the threat based on safety, economy, and
efficiency considerations, current production vehicles
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continue to be purchased to meet near and mid-term readiness
requirements, and cautioned that " ... if it ain't broke,
don't fix it •.• " [Ref. 39]. This methodology was
adopted as the basis for the analysis of current and future
force requirements and resulted in a detailed review of the
total force using the current force as a start-point and
building a heavy force package based on total force needs.
2. Working Group Prioritization Proposal
An initial fielding package was drawn up by the FMSWG and
DCSOPS. After several changes, a final Package I was
recommended for the upcoming RRC meeting (Table VII) .










* The LOS-AT mission module had reached Milestone I in August
1986 under separate development initiatives.
The entire family was organized into three packages, each
representing approximately one third of the AFV fleet. The
.force packages proposed by the FMSWG allowed the draft
Package I to be inserted into the FY90-FY94 POM •
.
c. Requirements Review Council (April 1988) and
Concurrent Activities
Controversy over the supportability of the
FMSWG/DCSOPS Package I proposal led to the cancellation of
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the AFV package review portion of the third RRC, held in
April 1988., An information paper on the status of the AFVTF
concept was presented instead. The CSA expressed mounting
frustration that a defensible and supportable Package I
necessary for bUdget formulation had not yet been achieved.
This package was needed to reduce the risk of AFV being
dropped from the bUdget again, and to gain OSD and
Congressional support. The CSA directed that a supportable
first fielding package for planning the FY90-FY94 POM be
developed and that the plan entail a clear view of "what the
Army wants [Ref. 41]". The CSA, concerned about
efforts to begin the management evolution process, also
warned, "Don't rush to acquire, don't rush to build
[Ref. 42]". Evolution at this stage could, in the
eyes of OSD and Congress, create the impression that the
Army was making a hasty move. [Ref. 43]
1. Technical Assessments
Despite the CSA's desire for a resolution to
the Package I dilemma, the effort to produce a supportable
first package was a long, slow process. The solution
eventually emerged from a set of exhaustive Tech assessments
that AFVTF had conducted during Phase I and the subsequent
AMC comprehensive Tech review, completed in the spring of
1988. These assessments provided estimates of the available
key technologies associated with each AFV's mission/role.
Discussions regarding these assessments led to a TRADOC
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suggestion that the Army work toward demonstrating the
capability to accommodate technically diverse AFV modules
into a family of common chassis prior to committing to a
long developmental process.
Based upon this initiative, TRADOC, AMC, and
AFVTF representatives met in May 1988, to identify candidate
AFV vehicles to undergo a OEM/VAL phase then stop before
FSO. This would determine the development and integration
risks involved with technologies related to these systems.
The vehicles tentatively chosen for these demonstrations
were based on selection criteria proposed by TRAOOC. The
criteria indicated that the vehicles should display maximum
divergence in mission requirements, integration, technology,
and producability challenges. This would include systems
with new, untried and untested battlefield capabilities, but
need not necessarily be systems included in previous Package
I prioritization efforts or the Tech Base.
[Ref. 44] Based on these criteria, new candidate systems
were identified' (Table VIII).














AMC concurred with this list but indicated
that the separate OEM/VAL phase without a subsequent FSO
phase was not realistic from a cost, scheduling and
marketing perspective. Nevertheless, AMC urged that the
Package I systems be identified and scheduled for
development as quickly as possible with the OEM/VAL
candidates being drawn from them. The TRAOOC initiative had
effectively reintroduced the original Phase I process of
using requirements-based priorities rather than vehicle-
based priorities as the best method for determining AFV
Package I. This constituted a second attempt to begin the
managerial evolution of the AFV concept. AFVTF fully
supported the reintroduction of this design method.
2. TRADOC Prioritization Guidelines
After TRAOOC's first attempt to arrive at a
satisfactory Package I, the AFVTF vehicle prioritization
guidelines were redefined to recognize the way that the new
heavy force vehicles were to be developed. This required
that the package stress commonality, modularity, growth
potential, and maximize economies of scale. Additionally,
the first package vehicles must reduce the O&S burden,
reduce logistics and maintenance requirements, and improve
vehicle reliability and maintainability (RAM).
[Ref. 46]
The establishment of these guidelines led to
a specific list of principles to guide selection of
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Package I candidate systems. The selection guidelines were
based on:
1) the ability of current systems to perform their
battlefield mission,
2) the projected date when the threat would affect
current system capabilities,
3) expected system obsolescence of current systems,
4) the availability of overmatching capabilities
through leap-ahead technologies, and
5) the delaying of system introduction to
capitalize on emerging leap-ahead technical
capabilities.
New vehicles were planned to be introduced only if
compatible with existing force capabilities or until other
essential vehicles were concurrently produced to provide
that capability. Only vehicle packages that provided
significant warfighting enhancements would be chosen.
[Ref. 47]
3. Package I and II systems Requirements
Using the new guidelines, the next step in
the TRADOC process was to determine near, mid, and long-term
requirements related to each identified AFV mission. During
this process, the ability of current, upgraded, or
replacement system to meet the requirement in terms of
mobility, survivability, lethality, and other similar
performance factors was a prime consideration. Issues also
developed inVOlving the funding and scheduling of projected
improvements or replacement systems resulting in a "neck-
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down" (Figure 14) process. The most urgently needed systems
were packaged into two groups (Table IX).
Although it was not originally considered
for Package I, the FACS (a tank-like vehicle) was targeted
as the primary (lead) AFV system due to the complexity and
criticality of its chassis design to other heavy vehicles.
The ongoing M1 Abrams tank, Block modernization program had
expected to integrate electrothermal or electromagnetic
weapon systems into the M1A3 (or M1 Block III) tank. with
these weapons, the M1 series of upgrades had been considered
sufficient to meet the threat. When it was sUbsequently
determined that these weapon system technologies would not
be available to meet threat-driven timelines, FACS was
placed into package I. Another consideration was that both
the future Block III tank and the FACS were each based on
designs that were significantly different from the original
M1 design, essentially completely new vehicles. As
procurement of three (the M1A2, M1A3 and FACS) , distinct
tanks was unaffordable and would detract from the desired
commonality, a determination was made to combine Block III
and FACS requirements. This vehicle became commonly
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Table IX - Priority Package I and II Systems
[Ref. 48]








The priority Package I and II vehicles,
along with the selection criteria, supporting rationale,
guiding principles, and TRADOC recommends, were briefed
during the summer of 1988. The package II systems were not
expected to be developed immediately but were to be fielded
as soon as resources and schedules permitted. Subsequent
review of this listing raised calls for the inclusion of
several other vehicles, most notably, of the AFAS-C system.
Since the current howitzer improvement program (HIP) was not
focused on correcting major chassis mobility and reliability
deficiencies, the AFAS-C was added to Package I. The
inclusion of AFAS-C, however, remained a contentious issue
for months.
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In June 1988, collaboration between the
AFVTF/A3STF became the basis for development of an
integrated Army modernization strategy and specified near,
mid, and long-term armored vehicle requirements. This set
the stage for the final AFV prioritization review in August
1988.
4. Armor/Anti-Armor Special Task Force (1988-
1989)
The Armor/Anti-Armor (A3) Special Task Force
(A3STF) was chartered by the eSA, in June 1988. Unlike the
AFVTF's long-term focus, the independent A3 study effort was
responsible for assessing the Army's current combat vehicle
and weapon system deficiencies and for developing a
comprehensive near and mid-term modernization plan for
armored and anti-armor weapon systems.
A3STF research, identifying what was termed
an armor/anti-armor crisis, declared that the appearance of
reactive armor on Soviet tanks and armored personnel
carriers would offset the qualitative advantages of U.S.
armored systems and further change the balance of ground
combat power in favor of the Threat. The A3STF had examined
a number of solutions to their problems but experienced
difficUlty in determining effective solutions. After
initial discussions with AFVTF regarding the Phase II
disciplined evolution requirements for upgrading current or
developing mid-term systems, the two groups began to jointly
seek mutually acceptable solutions. Through collaborative
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efforts, the two task forces were able to develop solutions
that satisfied the requirements of their independent task
force charters. A3STF assisted in defining AFVTF's near and
mid-term solutions while two of the AFV vehicles resolved an
A3 force requirement.
5. Armored Family of Vehicles Development
Concept
Throughout the summer of 1988, AFVTF
maintained its support of the traditional development cycle.
ARSTAF's continued objections, however, fina~ly led AFVTF to
conclude that the AFV concept would not be assigned program
status unless they dropped their objections. In August
1988, bowing to ARSTAF pressure, AFVTF revised the AFV
development concept allowing Package I vehicles to proceed
through FSD according to their individual merits after a
successful joint Milestone I decision. This was known as the
Option II timeline strategy (Figure 15) and the breakthrough
permitted the AFV concept to meet budget requirements more
easily.
The AFVTF briefing chart (Figure 16),
initially designed to illustrate AFV development concept,
shows the conceptual overview of the program to date.
Beginning on the left of the chart, AFV started with a set
of requirements and technologies. During Phase I, the
initial concepts were brought through a Milestone 0 decision
(August 1986). Following the milestone, operational
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family based on commonality and modularity. The system
concepts consisted of replacements for existing armored
vehicles or substitutions for mission functions normally
preformed by trucks and involved concepts for new vehicles.
To arrive at Package I, AFVTF and TRADOC had
performed extensive prioritization efforts through the
integrated BTA studies. Funding realities finally forced
the task force to pick six AFV's to be developed first.
Next, following a successful Milestone I decision, Package I
systems would progress to advanced development, moving
through the individual development phases at their own speed
based on their developmental success. Milestone II and
progress beyond were to be conducted according to the
individual success of the systems. The only joint family
decision was to occur at Milestone I.
All systems not within the first package
remained in computer-aided design (CAD)/computer-aided
manufacturing (CAM) allowing the second and third priority
vehicles to be rapidly pulled from the computer data base
and proceed from CE/D to a shortened, advanced DEM/VAL
phase. This was possible due to the availability of a
mature chassis on which integration has already been
demonstrated; more simple systems would go directly to FSD
[Ref. 49].
The key to the entire development effort
involved two factors. These were:
64
1) the successful demonstration that a single,
multi-use chassis was achievable without
excessive compromise and
2) the successful integration of multiple types of
mission modules onto a the common chassis. The
Army was convinced that both factors were
readily achievable [Ref. 50].
d. Requirements Review Council (August 1988) and
Concurrent Activities
The August 1988, RRC meeting focused the
previous attempts to prioritize Package I, define the scope
of AFV, and formulate a workable system development concept.
During this meeting, the RRC officially approved the M1
BLOCK III and FACS merger, added AFAS-C to the Priority I
vehicles, and evaluated the Package I proposals. The TRADOC
Package I systems were slightly altered and internally
prioritized (Table X).
Table X - RRC System Priorities [Ref. 51]
Package I
FACS, CMV, LOS-AT, FIFV, FARV-A, AFAS-C, MEV, FC2V
Additionally it was determined that a long-term program
executive officer (PEO) management structure would be
instituted with the concurrent phase-out of AFV task force.
This allowed AFV to be developed and managed as a program
rather than a concept. The three industry teams were also
to be focused on package I and an overall heavy force
strategy (similar to that of the light helicopter -
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experimental (LHX) program) would be developed for AFV.
[Ref. 52]
1. A3STF Tank Review Program
A tank review program conducted under
A3STF auspices during August 1988, convinced the CSA to
approve the M1A2 (Block II) Abrams program in addition to
the approval given at the August RRC meeting for the Block
III/FACS merger. The M1A2 had favorable support in Congress
and was subsequently considered as a mid-term system in the
AFV disciplined evolution strategy. These programs were
scheduled to coincide with the fielding of the expected
Soviet FST II and III tanks, however, later funding problems
over the affordability of near, mid and long-term systems
forced the CSA to make a decision between future
modernization or near and mid-term up-grades.
2. Advanced Technology Transition
Demonstrators
As individual vehicle efforts began
competing for the same resources, merging the AFV common
chassis, M1 Block III, HIP/AFAS-C program, and other ongoing
efforts and AFV systems became necessary. A coordinated
effort was needed to consolidate all the resources for these
requirements. This consolidation evolved over time into the
HFM strategy and a fully integrated HFM Package I. The AFV
(HFM) Package I was based on the projected development
cycles of the various systems. Development of the lead
system, the Block III tank, was reinforced by the M1A2/3
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technology demonstrators already undergoing CE/D testing.
The Advanced Technology Transition Demonstrator (ATTD), a
TACOM initiative, had been designed to accelerate the tank
production development cycle to meet threat driven, FUE
dates and achieve cost reductions. The ATTD was intended to
demonstrate integration and interaction of advanced
technologies, focus development of related Tech Base
components, and define and correct system compatibility
problems. [Ref. 53]
An importance element of the ATTDs research
program was its plan to by-pass the standard OEM/VAL
approach in favor of a transition approach that would take
it from CE/D to FSD, using the ATTD experiments in place of
OEM/VAL. ATTDs had been approved and encouraged by Congress
as well as OSD and the Army believed that acceptable levels
of system maturity and integration confidence could be
achieved with an ATTD based component maturation with a
minimum of developmental risks. AFVTF's concession to use
ATTDs in the development cycle led the ARSTAF to fully
support the AFV concept and finally authorize conversion of
AFV from concept to a program.
The M1A2/3 heavy chassis, already in CE/D,
provided the other heavy systems with a ready-made ATTD and
was subsequently used as the basis for the common heavy
protection level chassis. The draft development plan was
then expanded to include integration of a medium protection
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chassis. To complete the plan, other mission module designs
had to be considered in relation to the chassis design thus
representing the full AFV Package I array. Due to schedule,
resource, and technology limitations, mission modules
requiring medium chassis were to be situated on interim
M2/MLRS chassis until a new state-of-art, medium chassis was
developed.
3. Pa~kaqe I Development cycle
A proposed AFV Package I was eventually
depicted in a AFVTF concept briefing chart (Figure 17). It
illustrated many of AFV's unique concepts in addition to its
diverse mission requirements. The concepts included
integration of mission modules with the common chassis, a
balance between commonality and performance achievable by
the first six vehicles, and significant cost reductions
achievable by non-redundant concurrent developmental/
operational (DT/OT) testing of the chassis.
[Ref. 54]
Based on the proposed development cycle, the
DEM/VAL phase was eliminated for the six tentative Package I
vehicles and use of the ATTD approach was planned for the
development of the FACS, AFAS-C, FARV-A, LOS-AT, and
eventually the CMV and FIFV. Since the FARV-A supported
AFAS-C on the battlefield, the two were to undergo
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From February to April 1988, the AFVTF saw
two of its key positions overturned. Concurrent development
of individual systems after Milestone I was changed to
separate individual system development and use of ATTDS
replaced the recommended DEM/VAL approach. In preparation
for the September 1988 RCC meeting, AFVTF fought hard for
preservation of the concept of total system integration, a
key element of the AFV concept. This idea survived the
weeks leading up to the RRC meeting and remained a
foundation of the family concept along with the foundations
of commonality and modularity.
e. Requirements Review Council (September 1988) and
Concurrent Activities
The September 1988 RRC meeting focused upon
program management and resource issues to support and field
AFV Package I. The conceptual AFVTF transition plan and
schedule was presented during the meeting. The plan
suggested using the newly mandated PEO position to handle
the more unique elements of AFV system acquisition while the
traditional program managers were employed to handle vehicle
specific development organizations. Specific
recommendations were to:
1) approve the proposed AFV Package I,
2) use the option II timeline development cycle,
3) award FY89-FY98 design contracts to the three
industry teams with the focus modified to
package I, and
4) establish the new PEO.
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The proposed schedule recommended conducting transition from
January 1988 to April 1989 at which time the PEO would
assume full operational control. [Ref. 55]
The RRC was concerned over the proposed
schedule, the new statutory acquisition requirements, and
the need to gain the support of the new Army Acquisition
Executive (AAE). These concerns prevented the immediate
approval of the AFVTF recommendations. Objections were also
voiced over awarding industry contracts prior to adequately
preparing OSD and Congress. Nevertheless, the CSA directed
only minor changes to the proposed Package I (Table XI).
Table XI - CSA, Package I Vehicles [Ref. 56]





Additionally, the PEO management proposal was approved. The
CSA directed that an updated AFV development plan and a
pUblic affairs strategy and a plan for gaining OSD and
Congressional support had to be defined in detail would have
to be ready by late September 1988. [Ref. 57]
Following the RRC meeting, POM and funding
actions were permanently shifted from AFVTF to the new
71
ASARDA office in preparation for upcoming budget
deliberations. An intense and detailed budget review (known
as the "Midnight Drills") ensued to quickly develop the
funding profiles for AFV Package I, refocus the industry
teams and the Tech Base, and prepare Package I for inclusion
into the FY90-FY91 budget and FY90-FY94 POM.
t. Armored Family of Vehicles Transition to the
Heavy Force Modernization Program
During this period, the final conversion of AFV
Package I into a component part of the HFM strategy took
place. This involved attempts to structure the RD&A effort
and the production/deployment plan with individual vehicles
that could be supported by available funds. This effort
cemented the linkage between Package I and ALB-F and
established the Army fielding policy of deploying AFV to the
"first-to-fight" forces (Figure 18 & 19). This move to
clearly define the Army's AFV strategy provided the
justification for the program's name change from the AFV
package I to the HFM strategy and HFM package I. The change
decision was partially based on the previous success of name
changes in the earlier aviation modernization plans.
[Ref. 58]
The HFM strategy entailed modernizing and
•
fielding new AFV vehicles for the first to fight forces.
Their equipment would be up-graded and then be redistributed
to the follow-on units. This strategy established a
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an individual near, mid, and long-term fielding approach.
This resulted in projected early cost savings based on the
reduced, initial purchase of AFV vehicles.
[Ref. 59]
q. Armored Family of Vehicles, Decision Review
In late September, the eSA held an AFV decision
review to present the revised AFV strategy. It resulted in
the eSA's final decision on AFV strategy, composition, and
transition details. The eSA directed that Package I remain
as specified in early September and directed that AFV be
made an integral part of the Total Army Force Modernization
Plan. The development and acquisition of the Package I
fleet was expected to provide similar, although reduced,
cost, schedule, and performance benefits as those originally
envisioned. Nevertheless, Package I was expected to fully
achieve its planned synergistic operational effectiveness.
The AFV strategy the emerged from the Phase I and II
efforts:
1) provided a substantial increase in warfighting
capability within the current resource
constraints,
2) integrated force enhancement characteristics as
required by ALB-F,
3) facilitated future force modernization,
4) improved the ability to conduct high tempo
operations on the 21st century battlefield, and
5) expanded close combat operational capabilities.
Additionally, the strategy:
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1) allowed AFV to be fielded inside the Soviet
modernization cycle,
2) addressed the most urgent force requirements in
the current fleet while allowing for P31
improvements,
3) minimized fielding turbulence due to the HI/LO mix
strategy, and
4) established a future heavy protection level
baseline and provide an interim solution for
medium systems. [Ref. 60]
This review marked the end of AFVTF Phase II.
The CSA's final AFV decision was based on a complex,
comprehensive formulation process and represented a
consensus of support by Army leaders, ARSTAF, and the
MACOMs. The new AFV/HFM strategy continued to be reviewed
and refined in terms of affordability, emerging
requirements, and OSD and Congressional acceptance.
Nevertheless, it had been made a key component of the Total
Army Modernization Plan and was staunchly defended in all
future budget negotiations. The scope of the AFV/HFM
strategy was reflected by a chart showing a synopsis of the
development concept and depicted the essence of the
September 1988, Package I decision (Figure 20).
h. Conventional Systems Committee Briefing
With required funding streams identified, ARSTAF
briefed the Conventional Systems Committee (CSC), in October
1988, on the AFV strategy. By canceling selected programs
and altering the funding of others, AFV was briefed as a























































0••• \ t:. HFM!::J. aLI< 11\
DAB idS V
COMrONEl'IT AOV TEcn TEST 8EU I




~~ 1\c:.tV 1Cr.P AiTl) CMV no
\ / PRODIDEPLOT I
WPN SUDSTS rsul
FIN II 11N 180 -)
I PRODIDEPLOY )
.
I ATTD ATAS no 1ATAS / PftOOIDEPI.OT I
LOSAT l.()fIAT AU I L09AT FSU ~ PROOIDEPLOT I
fA RV." I AiTD I T"RV·" no ~ PROOlDEPI.OT r ~
various RO&A programs. The information paper, explaining
program funding proposals, subsequently became the
underlying draft program strategy document and in March
1989, the document was approved as the HFM program
acquisition strategy.
C. EVOLUTION OF THE HEAVY FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM
(1989) AND ARMORED SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION ACQUISITION
PROGRAM (1990-1991)
The second segment of the ASM historical summary
continues with a review of the HFM Program and ASM
Acquisition Program efforts. The AFV concept as structured
in August 1988, represented a fundamental change in the way
that the Army would conduct future medium and high intensity
operations and eventually became a cornerstone of the total
Army modernization efforts. Unlike the AFVTF experience,
however, after the AFV concept transitioned to the HFM
program, it became an increasing target for critics and
their program challenges. In a 1990 attempt to quell
mounting criticisms by Congress and OSO, the program was
transformed virtually overnight into the ASM acquisition
program and given a broader scope.
ASM struggled for the next two years against
environmental factors and circumstances to maintain the
program baseline that the Army had based the future of i.ts
heavy armored forces on. Increasingly, program concessi.ons
began to dilute the innovative and unique elements of the
program. Toward the latter part of 1991, the Army and PEO-
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ASM were compelled to undertake major restructuring of the
program in order to keep it alive. (Table XII).
Table XII - Event Timeline continued
• APR 1989 - AFVTF disbanded and PEO-HFM assumes HFM opcon;
• MAY 1989 - OSD program milestone and ATTD challenge;
• JAN 1990 - Operation Just Cause after-action report;
• FEB 1990 - HFM converted to ASM;
• MAR 1990 - CSC pre-DAB meeting;
• APR 1990 - DAB ASM review;
• JUN 1990 - ASM Milestone I and Block III DAB postponed;
• AUG 1990 - ASM ~ilestone I and Block III DAB, program
receives approval;
• NOV 1990 - Tier II armor procurement atudy;
• OCT 1990 - AAE policy change;
• NOV 1990 - Congress places temporary halt on LOS-AT;
• DEC 1990 - AVTA and TCM receive common chassis contract;
• MAR 1991 - Contract protest filled by GMC;
• APR 1991 - Desert Storm after-action report;
• JUN 1991 - GMC protest overturned;
• JUL 1991 - GAO ASM investigation conducted;
• AUG 1991 - Congress encourages ASM program reassessment;
• OCT 1991 - Army proposes ASM restructure plan, denied by
OSD;
• DEC 1991 - Army proposes 2nd restructuring plan, denied by
OSD;
• JAN 1992 - ASM undergoes major restructuring.
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1. Threat Assessment and Trends, 1989 - 1990
Despite indications of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact
decline in 1989 and 1990, intelligence appraisals continued
to predict rapid erosion of Allied technological superiority
and warned of a continued Soviet conventional threat. l;:n
late 1989, political and economic signs pointed to the
severe stresses within the Communist Bloc, however,
intelligence assessments indicated that glastnost and
••• perestroika [were] not inconsistent with improved
Soviet combat readiness •••. [and that] •.• a smaller
Soviet Army offer[ed] advantages to the threat
[Ref. 61].
Projections also indicated that
Soviet modernization will continue .••.with increased R&D
expenditures .••• [and] .•. that the threat is not likely to
diminish .... in fact, it is likely to increase
[Ref. 62].
Mirroring intelligence reports, the final A3STF report
concluded that the u.S. was in danger of falling behind the
Soviets and that the Army was " .•. behind, must catch-up, get
ahead, and stay ahead [Ref. 63]".
The conclusions of the 1988 DSB's similarly
maintained that the U.S. must counter and overmatch the
soviet armor/anti-armor threat and reaffirmed earlier
recommendations that a family of close combat vehicles,
based on a future tank, was essential. The DSB urged the
Army to speed-up advanced technology transition through the
use of ATTDs as a method of regaining ground over the
Soviets. Speculation indicated that soviet military
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downsizing could result in improved combat readiness as land
force modernization appeared to be the soviet's top
priority. These indicators showed that soviet armored
system modifications would continue and R&D expenditures
would increase. It was thought that with additional R&D, a
smaller Soviet Army would become more technologically
advanced at reduced cost while still retaining its numerical
superiority. Finally, reports theorized that the new
reactive armor packages on Soviet tanks and the projected
fielding of two new tanks before the year 2000, had changed
the land force balance of power. This caused Army leaders
to determined there was no need to reexamine or reassess the
requirement for HFM. [Ref. 64]
2. Heavy Force Modernization Transition and program
Development (1989)
Transition of AFV to HFM was conducted over a four
month period, from January through April 1989. During this
period, AFVTF continued to manage daily operations while the
HFM program office was established and gradually assumed
operational control. Existing AFV plans, schedules and
documentation (Figure 21) were reformatted to the new HFM
focus while program analysis efforts began to concentrate on
HFM Package I. New goals, objectives, and strategies were
developed to support the program's narrower scope, focusing
upon the HFM (AFV) Package I vehicles. A concerted effort
to gain aSD and Congressional support also began. HFM came
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Figure 21. Documentation Requirements
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to symbolize the Army's "blueprint" for armored systems
modernization. After receiving program approval, HFM was
tentatively scheduled for a DAB Milestone I decision review
in March 1990. All efforts were concentrated upon passing
this landmark.
a. Armored Family of vehicles/Heavy Force
Modernization Transition
Transition to the HFM program involved the
establishment of a new management team and program
organization to guide ASM through the development,
production, and fielding process. Transition was carefully
orchestrated to ensure an uncomplicated conversion ~nd
safeguard efforts completed to date. Transition principles
were enacted to ensure that continuity of intent and effort
was maintained. PEO-HFM was established to be a stable,
unambiguous, timely, and responsible program organization
making maximum use of experienced AFV personnel within its
organizational structure. Significant efforts were also
made to ensure that continuous industry involvement was
maintained throughout transition. [Ref. 65]
b. Initial Program criticism
As HFM became an officially sanctioned program
and transition started, critics began to challenge the
program. Army leaders and PEO-HFM received mixed signals
regarding support for the program based upon the threat
estimates but offset by a declining defense budget. The
Army remained confident that the program would be approved
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and fUlly funded, however, evidence pointed toward an
increasingly volatile acquisition environment.
PEO-HFM attempted to satisfy OSD and
congressional concerns by strict adherence to their guidance
for new-start programs. The PEO attempted to focus the
efforts of the Tech Base on HFM, accelerating transitions
from Tech research and design to development. Additionally,
HFM attempted to resolve the problem of declining defense
dollars through the use of shared technology and proclaiming
the cost reductions inherent in commonality and modularity
aspects of HFM.
PEO-HFM was the first major Army acquisition
program to be conducted under the new streamlined program
management structure (e.g. Defense Acquisition Executive
(DAE), Army Acquisition Executive (AAE), PEO, and program
manager (PM» and was structured accordingly to meet the new
statutory guidelines. Through active consideration of
common use solutions and development of a tailored
acquisition process, PEO-HFM's compliance with new statu'tory
and regulatory procurement guidelines convinced Army leaders
that they had taken the proper steps to ensure that the
program would be safe from serious challenges.
c.' Internal Acquisition Environment
Criticism of the program remained a problem for
HFM. An Army assessment of the internal acquisition
environment during the fall of 1989, exhibited the depth of
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concern and skepticism over HFM within the acquisition
decision chain. Congress believed that HFM was overly
ambitious, conceptually flawed, unaffordable, and "would die
of its own weight". Congress also noted that the program
was additionally complicated by the fact that a light tank
program was not an HFM component. OSD expressed similar
concerns implying that the program was ill defined, too
expensive, had an unrealistic timeline, competed with many
other major Army programs, and was the carrier of all
program "diseases". Even elements from within the Army
believed that HFM lacked a compelling case for procurement
and recommended a reduction in scope. Comments from the
Army acquisition and combat development communities
suggested that concern over HFM funding would increase.
Army support for current armored system modifications,
competing mid-term programs, and the long-term HFM over-
complicated the acquisition arena. Finally, it was thought
that there was no sense of urgency to define, combine, or
prioritize HFM systems and subsystems. [Ref. 66]
The overall perception was that AFV was
inexecutable and lacked the support and commitment required
to procure systems. While significant difficulties were
experienced in attempting to overcoming these impressions,
the Army continued to develop the HFM strategy and plan.
Responding to mounting criticism in March, 1989, the CSA
stated that
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.•• there should be no question as to our purpose. The
Heavy Force Modernization Plan is a blueprint for
disciplined evolution of the total Army heavy force into
the 21st century. [Ref. 67]
d. Acquisition strategy
The HFM strategy was divided into two principal
components, acquisition and contracting. HFM Package I was
based on a unique developmental approach conceived to
shorten development timelines, exploit related technolog'y
initiatives, and reduce risk and duplication through
learning curves (Figure 22). This was to be successfully
accomplished through maturation and integration of HFM
components and systems in Component, Advanced Technology
Test Bed (CATTB) programs and by the use of ATTDs. The CATTB
and ATTDs were expected to produce the confidence needed and
SUfficiently reduce the risks to proceed directly to FSD
without the resulting time and expense of a required DEM/VAL
phase. DSB recommendations and OSD and Congressional
initiatives seemed to bear out this plan citing the belief
that Tech Base technology transfer would be increased by use
of ATTDs prior to FSD. The use of a contracted HFM systems
integrator, managing the programs systems engineering
analysis (SEA), was also planned to aid the PEO through
commonality integration and configuration management issues.
[Ref. 68]
The second component of the strategy involved
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performance solicitations that fostered innovation, trade-
off optimization and cost efficiency, avoided "how-to"
criteria, and encouraged development of a broad industrial
base through heavy industry involvement and competition.
[Ref. 69]
The HFM program objectives were designed in
consideration of the decreasing defense budget but remained
primarily focused on the Soviet threat. Program objectives
stated that the priority of effort was to satisfy immediate
operational needs with the new systems being fielded within
threat-driven, time constraints and to fully support the
emerging ALB-F doctrine. Nevertheless, all systems were
expected to remain within affordability limits and new-
starts would be minimized.
HFM Program risk was to be minimized by
designing systems for optimum commonality and modularity.
The HFM advanced development phase would use the CATTBs and
component ATTDs to achieve system/component maturation. The
tailored, abbreviated development cycle consisted of:
1) a standard CE/D phase,
2) an advanced development phase characterized by
the use of ATTDs, CATTBs, and SEA to ensure
component and technology maturation and
integration,
3) a transitional FSD phase, and
4) a production and deployment phase.
The Package I systems were planned to achieve a joint




systems would be developed on separate timelines. The non-
priority family vehicles would remain in CAD/CAM with
selection of future systems for development based on
warfighting needs and available resources. Risk was to be
further reduced through contracting for the program's
systems engineering effort. [Ref. 70]
The systems integration and SEA effort was to be
administered by a contractor. The contractor was to provide
the PEO with engineering and technical experience in the
areas of chassis and mission module commonality, simulations
and modeling, and milestone documentation and production
assistance. Finally, maximum competition would be
encouraged between contractors with statements of work (SOW)
indicating "what not how" to the contractors.
e. Army Modernization principles
The Army established a foundation for the HFM
Program by defining a series of force modernization
principles tailored for HFM but applicable to total force
modernization. Program actions and decisions were then
justified on the basis of these principles and they remained
a basis for the program through its subsequent transition to
the ASM Acquisition Program (Table XIII).
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Table XIII - Army Modernization Principles [Ref. 71]
• Support Army warfighting requirements;
• Ensure level funding (prevent funding bow-waves);
• Provide most modern equipment to first to fight forces;
• Field modernized equipment faster than the threat;
• Modernize by force packages;
• Retain a system of systems approach;
• Allow ease of system upgrades;
• Preserve lethality and survivability;
• Control the age of vehicle fleets;
• Control O&S expenses;
• Focus and harness the Tech Base;
• Minimize training turbulence;
• Maintain a balanced force perspective;
• Continuous modernization based on a HI/LO force mix;
• Purchase current production systems to meet immediate
readiness requirements;
• Maintain the industrial base for mobilization.
f. Heavy Force Modernization Plan
The new Army modernization principles, in
turn, provided the basis for the Heavy Force Modernization
Plan. This plan mandated that HFM adhere to a set of
specific developmental guidelines. Supported by the Army
modernization principles and heavy force modernization plan,
the HFM acquisition strategy for the six priority HFM
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Package I vehicles was approved by the Secretary of the Army
in March 1989 (Table XIV).
Table XIV - Heavy Force Modernization Guidelines
[Ref. 72]
• Modernize systems to meet ALB-F operational requirements;
• Design/field a heavy force vehicle family that enhances
total force capabilities and reduces the logistics burden;
• Build an affordable force without placing battlefield
lethality or survivability at risk;
• Modernize the total force by thirds;
• Modernize forces from a current start-point (disciplined
evolution);
• Buy current and mid-term production systems (e.g. M1A1,
M1A2 Abrams tanks) .to meet readiness requirements;
• Modernize to meet the threat based on safety, efficiency,
and economic considerations;
• Maximize commonality and modularity to enhance
capabilities and reduce costs;
• Eliminate competing technologies and eliminate systems
with limited potential early;
• Design for P3I;
• Match vehicle protection and mobility levels;
• Field systems inside of the Soviet modernization cycle;
• Field vehicles by Force packages and in unit sets with
priority to first to fight units.
q. Heavy Force system Advantaqes
In order to gain the support of HFM
opponents, system advantages were then compared and
contrasted with those of current operational systems to
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illustrate and provide additional rationale for the
development and procurement of HFM (Table XV).
Table XV - HFM System Advantages [Ref. 73]






• Savings from integrated system development through:
• A focused tech base;
• System Commonality;
• Reduced redundancy;
• Shared test and evaluation (fewer prototypes required);
• P3I;





• O&S Savings resulted from:
• System modularity;
• Across-the-force training capabilities;
• Reduced repair rates (better system RAM).
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h. Test Beds and Technology Demonstrators
The Army advocated two unique methods for HFM
component maturation, the CATTB and ATTD. The use of these
developmental techniques was intended to sUbstantially
accelerate the process of demonstrating and validating the
technological elements of the common chassis, common
components, and modular systems while maintaining an
acceptable risk. The Army determined that these methods
would greatly reduce design risks and RD&A time and costs,
while enhancing overall system commonality.
The Army based their CATTB/ATTD decision
partially on DOD acquisition regulations that mandated
tailored systems development and DA regulations that
authorized the use of these methods. Packard Commission
recommendations also encouraged use of ATTDs prior to FSD.
Use of these techniques became a major point of controversy
as later OSD program reviews debated whether program risk
would actually be reduced or increased.
CATTB was a government sponsored component test
bed for technology development and not intended to be a
system or a prototype. The CATTB was designed to:
1) facilitate component and subsystem integration
and maturation,
2) help determine optimum alternatives between
competing technologies,
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3) provide a test and evaluation (T&E) interface
between industry and government developed
subsystems, and
4) verify technologies to allow the government to
make informed purchases.
HFM components such as fire control systems, track &
suspension systems, vehicle countermeasures, vetronics,
armor, and propulsion systems were proposed for maturation
on the CATTB. [Ref. 74]
The two different types of ATTDs (Common Chassis
Advanced Technology Transition Demonstrator (CCATTD) and
Mission Module Advanced Technology Transition Demonstrators
(MMATTD» were planned for use in the development and
maturation of systems, subsystems, and components. The
ATTDs were to be developed by industry as integration and
test platforms designed to determine the optimal Chassis,
common components, weapon systems and subsystems.
CCATTD/MMATTDs were intended to foster competitive
demonstrations of HFM chassis prototypes and integration of
weapon systems or system peCUliar subsystems on the
surrogate test chassis (mission module integration) mission
module prototypes. Planned HFM ATTD chassis demonstrators
were an M155 HIP surrogate for AFAS-C, an MLRS surrogate for
FARV-A, an- M2 surrogate for FIFV, and an M1Al surrogate for
CMV testing. The Block III would use the ATTD common, heavy
chassis previously developed for the M1A3 program.
[Ref. 75]
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i. suspension of Program operations
In May 1989, OSD temporarily suspended the
further conduct of the HFM operations. OSD expressed
concerns over allowing HFM, in its current configuration, to
proceed toward the HFM Milestone I DAB review, tentatively
scheduled for March 1990. OSD believed that while a
Milestone 0 decision had been reached for the earlier AFV
studies, no Milestone 0 decision had, in fact, been reached
on HFM. On the assumption that a HFM Milestone 0 notionally
occurred, OSD stated that it was no longer receptive to HFM
Package I as it had been structured. In OSD's
interpretation, since HFM had evolved into a concept quite
different from that of the AFV concept, the AFV Milestone
was no longer valid. To resolve this dilemma, OSD stated
that each vehicle needed to go through an individual
Milestone I review rather than the joint Package I review
that had become a part of the HFM development cycle.
[Ref. 76]
Additional OSD and Congressional complaints
cited that the program development cycle was not well
thought out. OSD indicated that ATTDs were not sufficient
to adequately reduce the development and integration risks
for HFM systems to by-pass the DEM/VAL phase and enter FSD.
Congress was becoming increasingly worried that large
amounts of funds would be expended on FSD before a
satisfactory product materialized. Finally, the T&E
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community was also troubled by the ATTDs issue. They
claimed they would be unable to conduct sufficient testing
on the limited number of ATTD systems that would be
developed prior to FSD. These concerns forced the Army
leadership and PEO-HFM to reassess key elements of the HFM
program and acquisition strategy. [Ref. 77]
j. Chanqinq Environment; operation Just Cause
Influences
During the fall of 1989, the Eastern Europeans
in large numbers were demanding an end to communist rule.
Many of these governments subsequently fell under the
popular will of the people. In the soviet Union, glastnost
and perestroika had brought about a new openness and decades
old Cold War tensions with the U.S. began to ease. In the
U.S., concerns over the spiraling National debt and a
mounting budget deficit resulted in calls for reductions in
defense spending and further demands to divert defense
dollars into social programs.
Rapidly changing international and domestic
events pointed to a quickly changing acquisition
environment. The activities and actions of Congressional
appropriations and armed service committees resulted in a
dichotomy of views over support for Army modernization and
procurement programs. Calls for procurement reform had
become a popular political issue as a Democratic Congress
sought to make an issue out of military spending.
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Two significant events occurred in December
1989. Contracts for CE/D studies were finally awarded to
the three industry teams in early December when Congress
approved HFM line ·items within the budget. In late
December, the U.S. military forces conducted a contingency
force operation in Panama (Operation Just Cause). After-
action reports from this operation indicated that the M551
Sheridan Reconnaissance vehicle, a vietnam era light tank
employed with the contingency forces, lacked the ability to
adequately support Army combat elements. This news brought
an instant reaction from Congress who noted that an Army
replacement for. the M551 had been in CE/D for over 12 years.
Based on the M551 deficiencies, the success of the Marine
LAV (light armored vehicle) program, and the fact that a
light tank was not addressed in the HFM strategy, Congress
threatened to withhold funding until the Army included a
light tank requirement in the HFM program.
Bowing to OSD and congressional pressure, the
Army began addressing the problems of the milestone
achievement, the abbreviated development cycle, and the
light tank requirement and the realization that significant
global and domestic changes were beginning to occur.
3. Armored Systems Modernization Acquisition Program,
Transition and Development (1990-December 1991)
In January 1990, responding to changing geopolitical
and economic conditions, HFM was redesignated the Armored
Systems Modernization Acquisition Program. The ASM Program
97
was expanded to encompass a comprehensive plan that focused
upon the total armored force rather than only upon heavy and
medium forces (Figures 23, 24, & 25).
O~spite this shift in emphasis, the Army maintained
that the Package I systems remained a necessity. The nature
of the acquisition environment, during this particular
period, was such that the Army was forced to repeatedly make
program alterations and justify its existence. Finally, in
the wake of significant environmental factors such as the
national deficit, Operation Desert storm, the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, and Congressional and OSO pressure, ASM
was finally totally restructured.
a. Modernization strategy Revision
In January 1990, FY90 funding for HFM (ASM) was
withheld by Congress to deal with initial Army reluctance to
include a light tank in the program. SUbsequent Army review
of the HFM strategy concluded that it must yield to
Congressional and OSO concerns over the reduction in the
Soviet threat and the performance of the M551. As a result,
a light tank requirement was added and the program was
refocused towards a regional threat. The Armored Gun System
(AGS) , a non-developmental (NOI) item separate from HFM
Package I, was planned as a near term solution to the needs
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include other light systems in addition to the HFM Package I
systems, however, prompted HFM to evolve into a
comprehensive modernization approach for both heavy and
light armored forces. No longer exclusively a heavy force
effort, the new modernization strategy was changed to the
ASM Acquisition Program (Figure 26).
Official ASM policy statements indicated that
"ASM is not just a name change but a plan to respond to the
changing world situation •
••. [the] Soviets will remain the most capable competitor
for the foreseeable future but the Army must field
capabilities that can defeat other threats around the
world. ASM provides the near term solution for
contingency forces and will continue to preserve the
Army investment for the future. [Ref. 78]
ASM was revised to also consider and provide
improvements to both near and mid-term systems. In the
long-term, the ASM Acquisition Program continued to
primarily concentrate on the future modernization of u.s.
armored systems. ASM retained the basic HFM advantages,
justification, and built upon the foundation of the earlier
HFM principles and plan. The conversion to ASM began in
January and was completed by late February 1990. The Army
intended to elaborate on the specific program changes during
the scheduled April 1990 DAB.
b. 050 Technology Demonstrator controversy
Based on the disagreement regarding ATTDs and
the milestone issues it had raised in the fall of 1989, OSD
refused to allow HFM to meet the DAB for its critical
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Milestone I review. OSD and congressional expressed concern
over the perceived risks in developing the new Package I
systems and the possibility of wasting diminishing defense
dollars on a failed abbreviated acquisition strategy. OSD
additionally charged that the Army improperly substituted
the ATTDs in lieu of the traditional OEM/VAL prototypes
which had been originally budgeted for.
Nevertheless, the Army made a strong case for
their development strategy stating that it had been properly
formulated to reduce the acquisition cycle. Further, risk
was being properly managed through the incorporation of
tailored acquisition methodologies originally advocated by
Congress and OSD. The Army felt its strategy of pre-FSD
risk-reducing, proof of principle (POP) demonstrations,
conducted in an operational environment rather than a
laboratory, would demonstrate the potential for new or
enhanced system capabilities. The strategy would also
improve the cost effectiveness of system development, and
reduce the required technological lead-time (Figure 27).
The Army stated that it had complied with DOD
directives to incorporate tailored acquisition approaches in
new system development and minimize the time taken to
satisfy development requirements without inducing
unacceptable risk (Figure 28). The Packard Commission was
noted as having encouraged that system and sUbsystem
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proceeding with FSO. The 1987 OSB study recommendations on
the Tech Base were also cited, indicating that ATTOs were a
logical extension of Packard Commissions recommendations on
prototyping and that pre-FSO system development should be
managed less rigidly and in a more streamlined manner than
current prototyping processes. The Army had also made a
substantial investment, at the urging of OSO and Congress,
to achieve capabilities in modeling, simulation, and CAOas
a method to further reduce risk. Finally, the Army
indicated that ATTOs were not prohibited by law, directive,
or regulation and " ... common sense [does not] dictate such a
restricted policy" [Ref. 79].
The Army concluded that if OEM/VAL prototypes
were mandated, the ASM schedule would have to be "slipped"
an estimated two(+) years. That would significantly add to
the low cost of the overall program, a major advantage of
the ASM program. The Army indicated that its plan assumed
success but was flexible. If ATTDs failed to demonstrate





the ATTOs could then be modified to focus on the
deficient areas,
the duration of the demonstrations could be
extended,
.
additional demonstrations could be implemented, or
a full scale OEM/VAL prototype phase could be
added. [Ref. 80]
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Despite arguments that use of the CATTB, CCATTD,
and MMATTD would keep risk to acceptable levels, the
proposed, Army development plan continued to remain a
contentious issue. OSD eventually directed that each system
would undergo separate milestone reviews before proceeding
to FSD. This was a change from the AFV option II, Miles'tone
1 development plan, virtually back to the original timeline
determined at the outset of AFVTF Phase II.
c. conventional system Committee Recommendations
In March 1990, the CSC conducted a review of the
foundation of the ASM effort, the common chassis program.
The Army was increasing concerned over the effects that
withheld prog~am funds were having upon program cost and
schedule. The lack of funds had delayed award of the common
chassis contract and without relief, would eventually force
PEO-ASM to cease operations.
The CSC, however, raised its own concerns over
the Army's justification for the ASM in light of the rapidly
changing Soviet threat and the need to counter new, less
dangerous regional threats. other issues included CSC
concern over program affordability in light of the
decreasing Army budget and that a common chassis ATTD might
constrain development of the four heavy varia~ts, not
all.owing designers to take full advantage of future
technologies. As a result, the Army was directed to review
the ASM plan and the risks associated with by-passing the
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d. Follow-up Conventional systems Committee Review
A subsequent decision by the CSC, in a late
March follow-up meeting, determined that the common chassis
development contract would not be economically viable unless
at least two of the Package I weapon systems passed
Milestone I. citing the withheld common chassis contracts
and the still unanswered question regarding the
determination of the ASM OEM/VAL phase, the CSC declared
that common chassis contract funds would not be released
until at least the first system passed a Milestone I review.
The Block III tank had been scheduled for review in June
1990.
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ASM procurement affordability was another
unresolved esc issue. To determine the proper course of
action, esc developed £our possible options for the
continuation of the ASM Acquisition Program. These ranged
from restructuring ASM to comply with the esc specified
OEM/VAL requirements to simply keeping ASM in the Tech Base.
None of these options, however, favored Army plans to
proceed according to their o~iginally structured strategy.
e. Defense Acquisition Board Review (April 1990)
In April 1990 DAB, the Army asked the DAB to
approve the original ASM common chassis development concept
and to fund the stalled contracts for chassis development
and component maturation. Despite disagreements between the
esc and Army, esc supported the ASM concept, based on the
capstone COEA and EA, and recommended approval of the
program. The DAB, consequently, approved the ASM concept,
supported the common chassis approach, and released the
withheld FY 90 funds with the understanding that no DEM/'VAL
contracts be would be awarded prior to the June Block III
Milestone I.
In preparation for the June 1990 DAB, a detailed
discussion of the pros and cons of technology demonstrators
versus full system prototypes was directed including the
latest threat assessments and a review of the current
armor/anti-armor systems under development.
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f. Defense Acquisition Board Postponement
(June 1990)
In June 1990, the Block III DAB was postponed
until August. The decision to delay the milestone review
resulted when the DAE determined in a DAB pre-brief that OSD
did not have sufficient data to refute the Army ATTD
position. The DAE also expressed dissatisfaction with the
Army's ATTD position and decided not to make a favorable
decision. A subsequent meeting with the DAE; AAE, and PEO-
ASM, elicited a positive response to the Army ATTD position
(Figure 29), but a final decision was postponed until risks
could be fully assessed. This reassessment effort required
at least two months to conduct. Consequently, the ASM
development timeline was again set back. This slippage in
the program prevented the release of funds for common
chassis contract award. The DOD enforced ASM schedule delay
sent the wrong signals to Congress and industry. This
resulted in backlogs within the AFAS-C and CMV programs and
placed ASM at risk by making it a target for FY90 - FY92
funding delays and reductions. [Ref. 83)
Meanwhile, Congress admonished the Army for
failing to properly reevaluate the decreasing threat and for
using the Block III as the lead ASM system. The Army
maintained that reduced funding was driving the order of ASM
development and production. Further, the tank required
development first due to its technical challenges and
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would actually be produced first due to its more advanced
mission module development and the.use of an interim
chassis.
q. Defense Acquisition Board (August 1990)
The DAB met to review the Block III Milestone I
in August 1990. At this meeting, the threat-based
justification for ASM was validated. The intelligence
community had verified ASM'sSystem Threat Analysis Report
(STAR) in February 1990. In August, they signed a joint
intelligence memorandum indicating that the Soviets, despite
reduced forces, still retained significant military
capabilities. It was determined that this capability along
with the increasing proliferation of Soviet and Western
technology and weaponry throughout the world, necessitated
continued modernization.
In another critical area, unmoved by Army
arguments regarding ATTDs; the esc recommended that the
program proceed with a standard DEM/VAL phase and require
the use of system prototypes. The DAB agreed and mandated
that the ASM system development strategy be based on
competitive common chassis fabrication followed by
integration of the tank mission module and chassis through
laboratory (rather than operational) efforts. Upon
completion of testing, the chassis would then be down-
selected to a single contractor who then would build, for
government validation, a full advanced development prototype
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(ADP) tank prior to FSD [Ref. 84] (Figures 30 &
31) •
with this stipulation, Milestone I was approved
for Block III and entry of ASM Package I into OEM/VAL was
approved, contingent upon the Army's accomp~ishment of
several actions prior to the scheduled september 1990,
armored vehicle DAB. The Army was directed to develop a
plan to mitigate the risk of the "down-select to one
prototype" strategy and the Cost Analysis Improvement Group
(CAIG) was to review Army cost estimates for the new
approach in light of growing questions over ASM
affordability. [Ref. 85]
This constituted the overall Milestone I review of
the ASM program. Revision of the ASM development strategy
had forced the Army to contend with developmental prototypes
but the scope of prototype use was limited. This
compromise, in an. attempt to satisfy both parties, reduced
the total time and funding required. Nevertheless, separate
prototyping and component integration for Block III was
required before moving into FSD. This delayed the IOC date
almost two years, from early 2001 to late 2002. with
purchase contracts for M1 tanks nearing completion and the
decision to not buy (to ensure ASM fUhding) large numbers of
the M1A2, the postponement created a gap in Army tank
production. Consequently, DOD wanted to start the upgrade






































... A Consolidated Army Position
t-.
Figure 31. OSD Directed Acquisition strategy
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was becoming increasingly difficult, due to constant
schedule changes, to make future scheduling and funding fit
the planned ASM production schedule. [Ref. 86]
h. Congressional Concerns
In September 1990, Congress and OSD expressed
concern over the order in which systems would be produced
and the cost and number of vehicles. The Army was troubled
by the August DAB decision requiring a pre-FSD tank
prototype. Reorganization of the ASM development strategy
required the Army to develop four heavy vehicle prototypes.
Block III fielding delays were projected to exceed four
years.
The Army still considered all systems to be high
priority and Block III remained the lead ASM system.
Congress, however, indicated that it wanted to see AFAS-C
fielding accelerated based on the current u.s. artillery
deficiencies as being experienced in the HIP program. The
Army maintained that its vehicle priorities reflected
warfighting requirements stating that Block III was the most
urgent system from a development point of view. Further,
the Block III common chassis had to be designed and
developed from the beginning to accommodate the tanks more
stringent operational requirements and ultimately supported
all heavy vehicles. In an attempt to satisfy Congress,
AFAS-C development was accelerated to the second priority
position but the Army kept the tank as the priority system.
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No other reassessment of ASM was conducted, however, the
Army indicated that it may alter ASM in the future based on
changing priorities and available funding based on Army
bUdget.
i. Tier II Armored systems Review
Tier II was an independent study jointly
conducted by OSD and the Army to review AGS system
procurement, the viability of a Bradley procurement
"stretch", M1 conversion to M1A2 specifications, and the
overall affordability of ASM Program. Conducted to support
the November 1990 DAB, the results of the review achieved
OSD concurrence for the purchase of 300 AGS systems to
replace the 70 aging M551 systems. Support was also given
for the Bradley purchase due to its chassis use in future
systems. [Ref. 87]
It was also determined that conversion of the M1
to M1A2 provided the highest increase in fleet effectiveness
at the lowest cost. As a result, M1 upgrades were
considered able to fill the projected four year gap between
the planned shutdown of the M1A2 production lines and start-
up of Block III production, thus preserving the tank
industrial base. The Army, however, had determined that it
would sacrifice M1A2 buys to keep dwindling procurement
funds for the purchase of ASMs. Army leaders had made a
conscious decision to forego near and mid-term systems, due
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to the reduced threat, in order to pay for future ASM
systems. [Ref. 88]
The M1 up-grade program caused great concern
within the Army as projected costs for the program ran over
the estimated budget. To effectively conduct the Ml up-
grades program, the Army would have to reduce other priority
programs, including ASM. ASM was additionally funded
through the POM but cost analysis showed that ASM portion of
budget would increase significantly after FY97. Budget
problems would be further exacerbated by the any future
funding reductions.
j. Threat Assessment, Late 1990
Results of threat assessments began to show the
extent of changes in projected u.s. threats. The National
Military Strategy (NMS) had began to refocus attention away
from the global Soviet threat to a more regionally-based
threat. While the Soviets were expected to remain the most
militarily capable threat to the u.s. for the next 20 years,
U.S. strategic interests were considered more likely to be
threatened by events in other regions. Intelligence sources
stated that "Political instability and economic duress were
expected to pose the greatest challenges to u.S. defense and
the potential for u.S. intervention is [now] global in scope
and runs the gamut from high to low intensity combat.
[Additionally], .... the advancement and proliferation of
western and Soviet technology, •••• as other nations are being
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equipped with new and modern weapons purchased from world
wide suppliers, .... combined with the aspirations of regional
power by many nations, present an array of increasingly
sophisticated threats" [Ref. 89] (Figure 32).
It was not until mid-1991 that the Army finally
acknowledged the full impact of global threat changes. This
persistent adherence to the conviction that the soviets
remained a significant threat, in the face of seemingly
contradictory evidence, caused the Army to lose credibility
at a time when it could least afford to do so.
k. Army Acquisition Executive policy Change
In October 1990, the AAE presented an address
that significantly changed the Army's acquisition policy.
This change in policy placed Army civilian acquisition
managers and military combat developers and operational
planners at odds. At a time when the program was under
severe attack by critics, this change seriously disrupted
the "one voice" policy and Army resolve to develop and
procure ASM Package I vehicles.
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1) the conclusion of the "big five" system (the Ml
and Bradley armored vehicles, the Apache and
Black-Hawk helicopters, and the Patriot missile
system) bUys,
2) a total Army acquisition budget (R&D plus procurement)
decline of 46% since 1985 (in real purchasing terms),
3) only three Army programs in the DOD top 20
programs, all in the last five, with none
scheduled for FY91 (Figure 33), and
4) Army procurement spending cuts of 64%, since 1985.
Of the three services, the Army received only 13
cents of every procurement dollar).
[Ref. 90]
The AAE' made two major assumptions in his
address:
1) the Army needed to sustainment the industrial base
and
2) that future ASM, procurement timelines would not
be supported based on major changes in
international and domestic events. Based on these
assumptions, the reasons for the Army procurement
dilemma were blamed on cuts in the Army
acquisition budget by double the amount of DOD
total obligational authority (TOA) reductions from
FY90-FY93. [Ref. 91]
The AAE indicated that OSD's unwillingness to
approve systems and the decline in R&D funds were due to an
inadequate Army modernization budget that was being
increasingly constrained by other Army priorities. Also,
OSD's risk adverse attitude and its search for "loose" funds
constrained the Army R&D budget. OSD had, in effect, become
a bigger challenge for program approval than Congress. OSD
was "looking for money and will not allow new programs into
development [Ref. 92]." OSD alternatives to
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1 B-2 (USAF) 5536
2. SOl (DOD-WIDE) 4471
3. DDG (USN) 3681
4. SSN-21 (USN) 3669
5. F-16D (USAF) 2973
6. M-X RAIL (USAF) 2836
7. C-t7 (USAF) 2700
8. F/A-18 (USN) 2123
9. F-15E (USAF) 1845
10. TRIDENT II (USN) 1746
11. TRIDENT SUB (USN) 1453
12. F14A/D (USN) 1118
13_ LHD-1 (USN) 971
14. AMRAAM (USAf) 915
h5~ PATRIOT iUSAl 909 I
16. TOMAHAWK (USN) 363
67. M·l TANK (USA) 838 I
18. ATF (USAf) 769
\19. BRADLEY (USA) 695 I




The Army probably will
have D.Q...Programs in the
FY92 DoD Top 20 list.
FUNDING BASED ON REQUESTED RDTE. PROC. & MILCON FY 91 $M
production, such as technology "roll-over" and "lay-away",
were designed to keep systems in the Tech Base, restricting
new production. Consequently, a new modernization strategy
was recommended to take those problems into account.
[Ref. 93]
OSD trends, at this time, were noted as:
1) reducing funding levels,
2) requiring additional justification documentation,
3) adding program content through prototype and
stretch programs and risk reduction,
4) conducting affordability analyses, and
5) by emphasizing strategic over conventional
programs. Army procurement was also being
constrained by Congress which was looking for
funds and trying to protect current production.
" they don't like us terminating Blackhawks and
M1s " [Ref. 94].
Congressional trends included reducing funding levels,
stretching long-term procurement through roll-over and
layaway techniques, and protecting the industrial base
through increases to current production. with Congress
reluctant to support new-starts, it was felt they would do
what was necessary to push current system production into
the future. As a result of these trends (Figure 34), the
Army 1980's production-based acquisition system was on the
verge of becoming a 1990's research-only based acquisition
system. [Ref. 95]
The AAE concluded that if the Army maintained its
course, current production would continue to be canceled,
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future systems would be delayed, and the industrial base
would shrink through non-use. Speaking specifically of the
industrial base, it was indicated that without an armored
system upgrade program, the tank industrial base would erode
significantly prior to Block III. This would result in the
break-up of design teams, specialized vendors would leave
the business, and restarting a dormant industrial base would
require 48 months to achieve current capacity and 60 months
for surge capacity. Finally, The AAE noted that, at current
rate of decline, the RD&A bUdget would eventually exceed the
procurement bUdget and continue to decline in the out-years
(Figure 35). [Ref. 96]
The AAE's recommendation was to rethink the Army
modernization strategy based on the recent threat
reductions. Additionally, a strategy of protecting near and
mid-term systems, rather than focusing on ASM, should be
developed as continued procurement of current systems might
provide the only opportunity for future modernization.
Finally, the industrial base could disappear if near/mid-
term production was stopped. As a result, the AAE
recommended three criteria for support of any future
production/modernization. These criteria were to become the
basis for the current Army acquisition policy (Table XVI).
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IPROCUREMENT IS UKElY TO DECLINE I
Figure 35. Decline in Army R&D Funding
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Table XVI - Army Acquisition Policy
New Army systems must:
• Provide significant improvement in warfighting capability
or the new program must meet a critical operational need;
• Support programs that Army can get through the acquisition
process without major problems (industry can deliver, the
acquisition structure can manage, and meet cost, schedule,
perform, testing, and fielding criteria);
--
• B~ a rovable b Ref. 97
Based on executability and approvability criteria, Army
leaders were encouraged to fight for additional Army
acquisition funding and earmark these funds to R&D. "At the
present funding levels the Army is out of major acquisition
program business and simply not serious about modernization.
[Ref. 98]" The ME also encouraged Army leaders to
reexamine their focus on only new, major long-term systems,
stating " ••. [we] can't put all our eggs into the long term
[ASM] basket •••• [Ref. 99]".
The ME cited ASM as an example of a potentially
flawed strategy and program. ASM had been given approval
but then subsequently had run into Block III capability
questions, industrial base concerns, affordability issues,
and dubious need based on the reduced threat. Concluding
his address, the ME commented on the 13 year ROC
formulation process for a light tank, indicating that the
Army had a tendency to look for "perfect solutions".
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Advocating a reconsideration of the M1 upgrade program, the
AAE stated that Congress was " ..• begging Army to build
upgraded M1's .... 11 and that in the future, II ••• [the Army]
may have to scale back its ambitions somewhat. 1I
[Ref. 100]
1. Temporary congressional Restriction of
LOS-AT
In November 1990, Congress mandated
restrictive legislation that linked the LOS-AT system to a
classified IIblack" program. Based on the restriction, the
Army experienced a five month moratorium on program
spending. The five month' delay added a large additional sum
to overall program development costs. The AAE complained
that the program was " .•• [being] held hostage, not delayed
by technical problems but by restrictive language."
[Ref. 101] LOS-AT and the classified program
were not related but lawmakers thought the only way to
ensure Army compliance with their ASM related concerns was
to hold-up the top-priority LOS-AT. This tactic was
expected to be increasingly used by Congress to ensure
compliance with their directives.
m. Common chassis Contract Dispute
Despite the restriction on LOS-AT, Congress
finally released funds so that the Army could continue with
common chassis development. In December 1990, based on the
revie of the proposals submitted by the three industry
teams, development contracts were awarded for competitive
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development of the common, heavy protection level chassis to
AVTA and TCM. GMC did not receive a contract and
subsequently filed a formal protest with the GAO in March
1991, arguing that it submitted the low bid while meeting
all technical parameters. Program chassis development
activity was suspended on the common chassis until the
protest was overturned in June 1991.
n. Renewed conqressional Concerns
For the first several months of 1991, the Army
continued to extol ASM as a counter to Soviet modernization.
As it became clear that the Soviets were slowing weapons
production and becoming more involved. in internal pol i tical
changes, ~he Army began to adopt elements of the AAE's
acquisition policy criteria. The Army attempted to format
ASM to meet the executability and approvability parameters
of the policy and SUbsequently declared the program to be
sound, based by achievable technologies, and supported by an
executable strategy.
Nevertheless, Congress still was not satisfied
with Block III'S developmental lead despite the movement of
AFAS-C into the second position. In response, Congress
mandated that AFAS-C be placed into a separate funding
account and cut overall ASM program funding by over six
percent from the Army's original funding request. The
system priority disputes began to threaten the long-term
economic and operational advantages of vehicle commonality.
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In an attempt to support the Army's position on
ASM, the AAE told Congress that the next generation of u.s.
Armored systems must not only be able to defeat the best
future soviet systems but defeat top-of-the-line western
technology as well. The AAE warned that large cuts in army
procurement accounts coupled with anticipated delays in the
Block III program would put the Army's ability to build
tanks in jeopardy. By this time, Block III slippage and
Army curtailment of M1 procurement had resulted in an almost
10 year gap in major tank production; this was expected to
have a significant impact on the U.S. tank-building
industrial base. [Ref. 102]
Congress, citing the reduced Soviet threat and
intelligence report that the Soviets had slipped the
schedules for their FST series tanks, indicated that the
Army argument for ASM was no longer credible.
o. operation Desert storm Influences
After-action reports of Operation Desert Shield/
Desert Storm equipment performance provided Congress with
renewed impetus to challenge the ASM program. A number of
system shortcomings during the war motivated Congress to
direct that the Army take specific action to correct these
system deficiencies. Many of the mandated "fixes" were of a
near/mid-term nature and cut into funding being shielded for
the future ASM program.
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Two of the war's "stars" also received
Congressional attention. The often maligned M1/M1A1 Abrams
tank and the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle preformed
much better than expected; high operational rates and action
against Iraqi, top-line soviet equipment raised additional
questions about the need for Block III and the FIFV. The
performance of these systems provided Congress with the
rationale needed to further demand current production be
continued and up-grades efforts be undertaken.
p. General Accounting Office Report
In July 1991, the GAO was directed by Congress
to report upon the justification, affordability, and
priorities of the ASM Acquisition Program. The report
concluded that the program was questionable for several
reasons. It admonished the Army for not reassessing the
changes to the Soviet threat and restructure ASM in light of
the new regional threats. It also indicated that it would
require a significantly greater outlay than was expected to
be available at the time when production would begin. A $39
Billion shortfall in weapons funding during peak ASM
production in 1998-2008 was projected (Figure 36).
Anticipated declining budgets and competing programs also
served to further constrain available funds. Current
artillery systems were deemed as being unable to meet the
current threat, however, the Block III still maintained the
lead position in the developmental schedule rather than the
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AFAS-C. Finally, it was noted that the M1 series could be
upgraded to meet any potentially envisioned threat based
upon current technology and was more cost effective than the
Block III. [Ref~ 103]
q. Diminishing Congressional support
By August 1991, the ASM debate had grown
substantially. Nevertheless, both the House and Senate
Armed Services Committees (HASC/SASC) declared their
continued support for the programs commitment to technical
superiority and actually increased funding. The SASC,
however, voted to slow development of ASM. Conversely,
HASC stated five major concerns and reservations to the
program as structured. These included:
1) the lack of a credible threat,
2) the unclear assignment of system armor protection
levels (AFAS-C was heavy chassis-based while LOS-
AT, which was thought to be a close combat system,
was light chassis-based),
3) the disproportionate emphasis on Block III when
the perception was that artillery systems were
needed,
4) the lack of an Army industrial base investment
strategy (linkage of ASM with current systems to
preserve the industrial base,
5) and the long development schedules of systems that
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Figure 36. GAO Projected ASM Funding Requirements
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Congress also indicated its dissatisfaction with the Army
for apparent "foot dragging" on both the AFAS-C and AGS
portion of the ASM effort. As a result of these concerns,
Congress directed the Army to reassess ASM.
[Ref. 104]
r. Proposed Restructuring Plan
In October 1991, the Army informed Congress that
it intended to restructure ASM to align itself with
Congressional directives to delay Block III and accelerate
development of AFAS-C and to match its procurement plans
with projected reductions in funds. Additionally, the Army
sought to complete the ASM restructuring plans prior to
being brought before the "000 budget cutters", the Defense
Planning Resour~e Board (OPRB).
The internal disagreement between Army military
material developers and operational managers (OCSOPS) and
civilian acquisition planners (ASAROA) over the disconnect
between ASM and the AAE's acquisition policy erupted,
eventually reaching to the highest levels of the Army
bureaucracy. OCSOPS insisted that the Army should forfeit
current system upgrades to save ASM funds. ASAROA argued
that ASM was not justified according to the threat and that
funds should be used to upgrade existing weapons and support
the Army industrial base. This internal argument, While
conducted, behind the scenes, did not escape the attention
of aso nor Congress.
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stating that it welcomed Congressional
suggestions to conduct a new assessment of the threat and
develop a modernization plan that linked ASM with M1 and
Bradley upgrades, the Army, nevertheless, was unwilling to
ask OSD for additional procurement funds. This was largely
due to the potential interservice fight that it could have
provoked. Despite the fact that there was probably not
enough funding in the out-year budgets to upgrade M1s, even
with sacrificing Block III to pay for it, the Army did not
cancel Block III but instead realigned ASM Program
priorities.
It appeared that ASM was caught in a "program
death spiral". Decreasing system quantities and spiraling
costs would be labeled inefficient by OSD, and thus become a
prime candidate for the budget-cutters "axe". Privately,
one Army source exclaimed,
••• we are trying to keep ASM on track with arguments
that do not meet the light of day. We really need to
reexamine what we have on the drawing board.•. [because]
••• the credibility of the Army is on the line.
[Ref. 105]
s. Program Realignment Alternatives
A second set of so called "midnight drills"
began in October. The Army, responding to calls for
cancellation of ASM, undertook a plan to refocus the ASM
strategy and preserve its battlefield capabilities while
shaping a new, more acceptable modernization program. The
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the Block III would be delayed until new capabilities
and technologies produced a technologically superior
tank, justified by the threat,
the AFAS-C and the FARV-A would be accelerated using
funds earmarked for Block III,
the current CCATTD effort would be modified in FY92
from development of a tank chassis to development of a
common chassis with emphasis on component commonality
for AFAS-C and FARV-A (in an effort to preserve the
original AFV tenants of commonality and modularity),
key ASM system Tech efforts would be continued,
the LOS-AT would be continued, and
the development of a command and control (C2) vehicle
based on the congressional set of Desert Storm system
initiatives would be initiated. [Ref. 106]
Nevertheless, the Army declared that they
•.• remain committed to the full ASM program over time
and across the full range of armored systems
capabilities because it is the best approach to ensure
technical overmatch on future battlefields. Along with
the Comanche [(a helicopter mod program also under
fire)], ASM is the Army's highest priority modernization
program. [Ref. 107]
t. Block III/Ml Upgrade Dilemma
By this point, the AAE's modernization
principles had gained significant support within the Army
acquisition community. A variety of acquisition experts
indicated that the Army should follow the policy. Support
for that line of thought was at the center of the
Congressional controversy over DA pursuit of the ASM Block
III tank rather than upgrading Ml tanks. Many argued that
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the Army did not have the funds nor the threat to justify a
new tank at this point in time.
The Army, aware of the diminishing support for
ASM, undertook another attempt to restructure the program
(Figures 37 & 38). Development of the Block III was
deferred, but only small steps were taken toward the
Congressionally mandated Ml upgrades. Meanwhile, the
disagreements between DCSOPS and ASARDA increased. ASARDA
argued that from a political and bUdgetary point of view, it
was better to upgrade near-term systems using the declining
procurement dollars than chance losing future funds
altogether. ASARDA stated that new systems should be
fielded when the threat dictates, money was available, and
politics were favorable. Conversely, DCSOPS felt that since
it could not "have it both ways", it would rather procure
the future ASM systems.
To resolve this issue, the Army began a series
of high level reviews to reassess ASM restructuring efforts.
The primary question needing resolution was the dilemma over
whether to use Block III development funds to finance the
near-term M1 upgrades, as based on a tank retrofit program
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Figure 38. Program Schedule "Slippage"
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done, the Block III would essentially never be built. The
gradual demise of tank industrial base had added additional
urgency to the question.
As development of Block III has slipped, the production
gap between the last M1A2 and a future tank have
widened•..•without Block III, [however] there was no
longer a tank plant layaway, it was tank plant closure
[Ref. 108] (Figure 39).
It was thought that a failure to come to a consensus might
also jeopardize the tentative M1A2 foreign military sales
(FMS) to Saudi Arabia, once again, further damaging the tank
industrial base.
u. Second Proposed Restructuring Plan
OSD had rejected the initial ASM restructuring
plan because it failed to implement the Congressional
mandate to modernize the M1 with out-year funds
additionally, the Army had yet to sUfficiently address
serious funding shortfalls.
By December 1991, the prospect of a near-term
Soviet threat had greatly diminished and the pace of Soviet
conventional force modernization had also drastically
slowed. The Army budget decline increased due to
Congressionally mandated, military down-sizing, which forced
a complete reassessment of the Total Army Modernization
Plan. Additionally, Congress had again raised the
industrial base issue and was pushing for upgrades and

















Figure 39. Projected Shutdown of Tank Industrial Base
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The Army's analysis and review of the ASM
strategy and the AAE acquisition policies produced a
decision in early December. The new proposal deferred
further development of Block III, FIFV, and the CMV but
maintained their key related, advanced technology components
in the Tech Base for continued development. AFAS-C and
FARV-A would become the lead systems and be based on common
components. AGS funding would also be realigned to reflect
the new schedule. Additionally, development and procurement
of LOS-AT was slipped while four Congressional, Desert Storm
initiatives would be implemented inclUding:
1) a C2 vehicle based on an M2 chassis,
2) an improved recovery vehicle,
3) engineer bridging and breaching vehicles based on an
M1 chassis, and
4) limited M1 upgrades and M1A2 production based on
funds allocated by Congress in the FY91 and FY92
bUdgets. [Ref. 109]
Upon submission of the new strategy, the Army
stated that
.•• the restructured program provided near and mid-term
improvements in warfighting needs, while providing a
potent antitank system (LOS-AT) and an overmatching
artillery piece for the post-2000 force. At the same
time, a future bridge for other members of the close
combat family is maintained through retention of the
common component concept and a robust Tech Base effort.
The Army remains strongly committed to the concept of
the ASM as a "goal. [Ref. 110]
With that effort, the ASM Program awaited OSD and
Congressional approval of the initiative. In early 1992,
143




III. ARMORED SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM'S ACQUISITION
ENVIRONMENT INFLUENCES
A. GENERAL
The ASM historical summary detailed the significant
characteristics of the ASM Program evolution. A review of
the summary unveils a succession of environmental factors
that negatively impacted upon the program. These
environmental factors, over the course of ASM's conceptual
and programmatic life, prompted a series of responses and
from Congress, OSO, and the Army itself. The actions of
these parties resulted in extensive revisions,
modifications, and alterations to ASM strategy and program
planning. The root causes of these actions have been
examined and a summary of the environmental influences are
presented below.
B. THE ENVIRONMENT AND FORCES FOR CHANGE
1. Environmental Influences on organizations
An understanding of what an environment and
environmental change mean and how they relate to acquisition
programs is important. Environment refers to the forces,
events, circumstances, and institutions that exist outside
of an organization, but nevertheless, affect its
performance. Forces within the environment play a principal
role in shaping organizational decisions and actions.
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Environmental factors may be separated into external
(general) or internal (specific) categories.
The external environment refers to everything
outside an organization and usually indicates such things as
political conditions, economic and technological factors,
and the social climate. These are conditions that may
affect the organization but in which the initial relevance
is not clear. Conversely, the internal environment is
directly relevant to the achievement of organizational goals
and is comprised of critical components and constituencies
that can positively or negatively affect an organization.
The specific environment is unique to each organization and
usually changes with conditions. The Department of Defense,
Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) specifically
defines the acquisition environment as being characterized
by
••• innumerable external factors [that] impact on, and
help shape, every defense acquisition program, creating
an environment that no one person controls. These
factors include forces, policies, decisions,
regulations, reactions, and emergencies.
[Ref. 111]
2. Organizational Responses to Environmental Change
Organizations must remain aware of the potential
influences on its general environment and respond to factors
that may challenge organizational actions. These
environments are difficult to manage since they differ by
degree of environmental uncertainty and complexity within an
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organization's environment. Many environmental forces are
dynamic and create considerable uncertainty for the
organization. To the degree that these environmental
uncertainties can not be anticipated, they force the
organization to respond in ways that it may not prefer. The
greater the environmental uncertainty that an organization
faces, the more the environment limits the organization's
options and freedom to determine its own future. Since
uncertainty is a threat to organizational effectiveness,
reduction of uncertainty is critical.
Managing environmental uncertainty is a continual
process and analyzing the environment that creates it is a
critical aspect of that process. Because an organization's
environment largely defines the available management
options, the successful administration of uncertainty will
help align the organization with its environment rather than
fight the strong forces of change that are often presented.
Consequently, an organization must have an accurate grasp of
what is happening within its environment, both general and
specific, and maintain an awareness of important trends that
might affect its operations. Effective management of the
environment entails being able to decipher the
contradictions of the acquisition environment and reconcile
them effectively into efficient action.
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C. ARMORED SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM AND THE
ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENT
In order to examine the ASM environment and determine
the actions and ensuing reactions that occurred, a set of
cause-effect matrices (Figures 40, 41 & 42) were constructed
to trace the environmental driving forces. These driving
forces have a tendency to direct actions away from a status
quo or equilibrium condition. Based on these matrices the
external and internal forces that induced ASM changes can be
seen. Principally, three external environmental causes were
sUbstantially responsible for all reSUlting program changes.
These were budget reductions, the dissolution of the
Communist threat and, the operational effectiveness of Army
armored vehicle systems during the two most recent u.s.
military operations (Operations Just Cause and Desert
storm) •
1. BUdget Reductions (Figure 40)
The changing nature of the Federal budget became a
major driving force behind program changes. Budget
reductions, regardless of the cause (e.g. Federal budget
deficit, peace-dividend, withheld funds), created a
environment where ASM affordability became a prime issue.
This resulted in a climate where cost reductions, smaller
outlays, bUdget-cutting, and risk adversity were the norm.
Affordability issues encouraged Congress to become involved
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Figure 40. Budget Cause - Effect Matrix
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system requirements and capabilities, and thereby directing
efforts to reprioritize the systems and review technology
considerations.
OSO mirrored the Congressional reactions to defense
bUdget-cutting measures, resulting in similar concerns
regarding ASM affordability, excessive expenditures, and
potential cost overruns. Consequently, OSO directed reviews
of ASM justification, strategies, and plans. OSO's risk
adversity slowed critical decision-making which further
added to ASM woes through schedule slippage and the
resulting cost increases. As a result, budget
considerations were at the root of the AAE's acquisition
policy.. This policy resulted in a subsequent high-level,
internal Army debate over the viability of the ASM program
and the need to reevaluate Army priorities. This infighting
significantly weakened Army resolve to support the program.
The cumulative effect of Congressional, OSO, and Army
reactions to the influence of an environment replete with
on-going budget problems was the eventual restructuring of
the ASM program.
2. Dissolution of the Communist Threat (Figure 41)
The dissolution of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat
precipitated a major change in the acquisition environment,
sUbstantially undercutting the rationale for the ASM
Program. During the early stages of the program, ASM was
primarily justified based upon the perceived threat. with
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the decline of the Communist threat, the Army had to quickly
justify their rationale for supporting the ASM program.
Later, the lack of a credible threat allowed a host of other
programmatic issues to shift to the forefront, such as the
development strategy, system priorities, and increased
technological risks.
Defense budgets reductions and reduced need for
leading- edge armored ~ystems accelerated program
challenges. As a result, support quickly eroded in Congress
and OSD for expensive systems designed to counter the
dwindling threat of Soviet modernization. After Desert
Storm, Congress largely came to the conclusion that current
systems were good and that with their help they could make
the near and mid-term systems better. Over a period of
months, Congress significantly redirected ASM priorities and
strategies. OSD, already leery of expensive new systems,
became increasingly risk adverse. Based on concern over
heightened risk, ASM was reevaluated several times,
therefore delaying approval of the Program and sUbsequently
causing schedule slippage and increased costs. Finally, in
reaction to the reduced threat, reduced budgets, and the
succeeding force draw-down, internal Army support for the
ASM program diminished significantly. New issues such as
reducing the further loss of Army R&D funds, maintenance of
the tank industrial base, and preventing the mortgaging of
current system authorizations for an uncertain ASM future,
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became primary considerations. Loss of the threat-based
justification for the ASM Program forced Congressional, OSD,
and internal Army reviews to recommend the complete
restructuring of the ASM program.
3. Operations Just Cause and Desert storm (Figure 42)
operations Just Cause and Desert Storm also
influenced and contributed significantly to ASM Program
changes. These combat operations demonstrated the true
performance of current armored system. The resulting after-
action examinations of their specific strengths and
weaknesses increased scrutiny and analysis of ASM related
issues.
Current armored vehicle strengths reaffirmed
Congressional resolve to mandate continued upgrading and
procurement of near and mid-term systems rather than
development of the future ASM Program. Current system
deficiencies, such as the addition of the AGS system,
resulted in Congressionally and OSD directed changes to ASM
strategies and plans. As a result of Desert Storm, the Army
was instructed to undertake near and mid-term "solutions" to
system deficiencies and acquire a new set of armored
vehicles based on the current systems that the Army wanted
to stop procuring. In both cases, Congressional oversight
and OSD guidance resulted in unmanageable demands upon
projected program schedules, increased costs, and led to the
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IV. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ARMORED SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION
PROGRAMS'S ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENT
A. GENERAL
The major acquisition related environmental factors
discussed in Chapter III had significant influence on the
ASH Program. A review and analysis of the cause-effect
relationships suggest a series of acquisition management
lessons learned. These lessons, however, are not based on
hard scientific quantitative data instead, they are based on
qualitative insights and deductive reasoning. They are not
intended to be all encompassing but rather touch upon the
larger issues discovered.
These lessons learned are intended for members of the
Army acquisition workforce and are provided as teaching
points and for management, administrative, and program
planning considerations.
B. LESSONS LEARNED
Over time, ASH depicts a series of circumstances in
which the Army lost the ability to fUlly control its
acquisition future at crucial points within a major program.
As a result of environmental influence, Army leaders an~ ASH
Program managers were virtually powerless to accomplish
initial program objectives and achieve forward momentum.
Had the Army been more flexible, proactive, and sought to
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transform environmental change into opportunity, disruptive
environmental factors may have been moderated resulting in
more favorable ASM outcomes.
Although each situation is unique, there are some common
criteria. Many factors can help to ensure a successful
strategy; large amounts of resources, opposition errors, and
effective implementation procedures name a few. Another key
factor is to understand the dynamics and complexities of the
acquisition environment. Complex strategies, plans,
organizational structures, systems and internal/external
environments mixed together to influence ASM Program
outcomes. These complexities may extend well below the
surface and as larger environmental issues are rooted in
details and each level can be pulled back to reveal new
insights. Effective acquisition strategies can, then, be
reduced to specifics. It is within these specific insights
that the Army may gain the advantage for dealing, one-on-one
with the acquisition environment.
The lessons learned presented'here are not meant to
suggest that Army strategic management or planning processes
and procedures are faulty. Many of the factors that
disrupted the ASM program may well have been beyond the Army
leaders and program managers ability to resolve
satisfactorily. Nevertheless, strategy is a mediating force
between the organization and its environment and most of the
lessons learned do involve the realm of strategy. The
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following insights into the ASM Program provide techniques
for managing the future acquisition environment.
1. comprehensive Threat Assessment
The threat must be viewed in a macro rather than
one-dimensional sense. All factors (events, circumstances,
capabilities, entities, organizations) that provide the
rationale to justify the need for a particular defense
system should be verified and validated. Lessons learned
are:
• Lesson Learned #1: Justify Systems According to
Requirements and/or Capabilities, Not One-Dimensional
Threats.
Acquisition programs should not be justified on
the basis of one-dimensional threats. New-start
programs must describe how they mitigate
mUltiple "threats" (e.g. geo-political
relationships, technological change, fiscal
projections, national objectives, programmatic
risks, temporal considerations) by satisfying a
series of requirements and achieving set
capabilities.
• Lesson Learned #2: Conduct Reaular Threat
Reassessment and Revalidation.
Regular internal reviews or "reality checks" of
the projected composite threat (additional to
such external reports as the STAR) should be
conducted to ensure system justifications are
closely linked with valid and verifiable
threats, requirements, and capabilities.
2. Relations with congress
The Army must do a better job of articulating to
Congress the necessity for its defense systems requirements.
Additionally, effective lobbying efforts must be undertaken
to gain and maintain needed support. Lessons learned are:
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• Lesson Learned #3: understand the Nature of the
Congress and congressional Interests.
Congress, as a political entity, maintains many
different agendas (e.g. home district
contractors, constituencies, jobs). An
appreciation for the programmatic related
concerns of congressional members (including
staffers) must be acquired and satisfactorily
addressed well before crucial votes. Effective
program lobbying efforts, through the
congressional Liaison Office (CLO) and Office of
Legislative Affairs (OLA), can bring dividends.
• Lesson Learned #4: Abide By congressional Directives
and Mandates.
An unwillingness to confront Congressional
concerns and follow the mandates of Congress may
cause the body to resort to a range of
persuasive "devices" (e.g. withholding program
funds, increased program scrutiny). The tendency
to relegate Congressional directives to
restUdying issues and conducting analyses, while
sometimes necessary, often gives the impression
of "foot-dragging" and "stonewalling". Without
underestimating the political gamesmanship that
is involved in such situations, prompt initial
compliance with Congressional directives and
mandates often satisfies the immediate interests
of those concerned and serves to reduce
oversight of particular programs in the future.
3. Relations with OSD
OSO interests often require greater efforts to
satisfy than Congressional interests. It is critically
important that Army leaders and acquisition managers
understand the concerns and appreciate the prevailing
political climate within 050.
• Lesson Learned #5: Understand OBD's Political
Foundations.
050 has a political foundation and consequently
often has an agenda that is at odds with the
military services. By its nature, 050 is able
to react to a changing political and economic
climate much faster than the services.
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Understanding OSD's linkage to the political
process and their ability to rapidly change
positions in support of the Executive Branch
will afford the Army information necessary to
prevent program non-concurrence.
4. Acquisition Guidelines and Policies
Defense acquisition and procurement guidelines and
policies are often the product of Congressional and OSD
collaboration.
• Lesson Learned #6: understand the Underlying Meaning
of Acquisition/Procurement Guidelines and Policies.
statutes, regulations, and guidelines are enacted for
a variety of reasons; many embody the prevailing
political climate of the time. These guidelines
should be thoroughly understood and followed. Be
aware, however, that policies can be changed rapidly
to suit a new political or economic climate.
Therefore, the early identification of new policy
trends is imperative.
5. Program strategies and Management Concerns
These lessons learned were derived from observing
the wide range of strategic Army responses to the changing
acquisition environment that occurred during the ASM
Program.
• Lesson Learned #7: Plan For Unexpected, Unknown
Factors.
The future is too uncertain to accurately
predict, therefore an attempt must be made to
evaluate the dynamics and complexities that
exist within the prevailing acquisition
environment. As a bureaucracy, the Army is
often reactive rather than proactive to change.
steps must be taken to monitor and anticipate
changing environmental factors and when
necessary, be prepared to change program
direction. Contingency planning and what-if
analyses must be used to mitigate reactive
responses to change, thereby allowing Army
decision-makers to be proactive in their
responses.
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• Lesson Learned is: Establish Periodic strategic
Reassessment Points.
Established periodic reviews should be
incorporated to determine if the possibility of
strategic environmental shifts or changes are
occurring. At the reassessment points, a review
of political and economic factors, Congressional
and OSD support, the comprehensive threat, and
requirements/capabilities should be conducted.
This will permit the prevailing acquisition
environment to be assessed and allow Army
decision-makers to then make timely and prudent
adjustments to program baselines.
• Lesson Learned #9: Ensure Mutually supportive
Acquisition strategies.
Acquisition efforts should be conducted
according to an integrated and mutually
supportive set of strategies. Just as all Army
operations and planning efforts support the
goals and objectives of the National Military
strategy, so too should all internal Army plans
be mutually supportive. Army Modernization
objectives and strategies for system development
and procurement must not be at odds with sound
Acquisition pOlicies and practices. They must be
fully integrated so that one does not undercut
the objectives or precepts of another.
• Lesson Learned il0: Repress organizational paradigms.
A tendency exists in any organization to view change
in terms of specific familiar and routine structures
or patterns, thereby causing a narrow focus or "tunnel
vision". Unintentional adherence to internal paradigms
may cause important considerations and possible
solutions to be overlooked. The internal resistance
that results from focusing on paradigms limits the
possibility of contrOlling the effects of change and
converting environmental changes into opportunities.
• Lesson Learned ill: safeguard Rey Program concepts
and Ideas.
As programs negotiate the acquisition approval
Chain, a conscious and concerted effort must be
made to safeguard the most important conceptual
elements and components from being substantially
diluted or curtailed during the process.
Important concepts and ideas are the product of
great time, effort, and analyses. In many
cases, these emerging concepts/ideas have
survived a process that often nullifies unique
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and innovation solutions. The rationale and
justifications for these concepts and ideas
should not be forgotten, but need to be fully
addressed and reviewed when challenged.
• Lesson Learned #12: Focus on Program Ends Rather Than
Specific Means. Army programs are designed and
developed to satisfy specific warfighting requirements
and capabi~ities. In pursuit of these objectives, the
means for attaining the end result often becomes
skewed from planned baselines. Compromising, with
regard to program strategies, methodologies, and
plans, should be considered an integral component in
the achievement of the specified end objectives.
• Lesson Learned #13: Operational Planners and Material
Developers Must Comprehend Political and Economic
Realities. Planners and developers often lack
understanding of the political and economic
compromises and concessions that often must be made to
ensure positive program decisions are obtained. A
cooperative rather than adversarial relationship must
exist between Army the requirements generators and
acquisition managers; mutual trust in the specific
competencies of each of these groups must be paramount
if program consensus is to be reached and maintained.
• Lesson Learned #14: Maintain program Consensus. Army
leadership welcomes the very important and necessary
internal discussions and debates over acquisition
strategies, plans, and policies. However, once a
consensus is reached, infighting and pUblic
disagreement over official Army policy undercuts the
consensus, confuses external decision-makers, and make
programs into targets for change. All Army components
must maintain a consensus ("must speak with one
voice") with regards to its 'acquisition programs until
internal Army decision-making bodies deem otherwise.
• Lesson Learned #15: Instruct Acauisition Manaaers in
the Art of Political compromise. In addition to a
lack of understanding of the political/economic
processes that often decide the fate of acquisition
programs, a general lack of understanding of
negotiation and compromise appears to exist. Rigid
adherence to virtually all aspects of a programs
objectives, strategy, and plans often ends with
detrimental results. Unwillingness to compromise
usually results in forced program modifications or
changes above and beyond what might have been obtained
if negotiation and mutually beneficial compromises
were sought. Conversely, compromise, negotiation, and
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flexibility allow room for maneuver and often can be
orchestrated into a "win-win" situation for all
parties involved. An educational program needs to be
established to help decision-makers master the art of
political compromise. The adroit use of negotiation
and compromise will allow Army decision-makers to
maintain key elements of its acquisition programs
while achieving its end objectives.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATiONS
A. GENERAL CONCLUSION
Analyzing the acquisition environment is a critical
aspect of the acquisition process. Despite the fact that
each environmental condition is often unique, the influence
of unknown and unexpected factors can not be left to chance.
The environment surrounding the Army acquisition process
largely defines the management options in the procurement of
new systems. The lessons learned derived from this thesis
provide a point of reference and areas for analysis. They
provide avenues for evaluation and management of
environmental influences and change. Environmental
management should be thought of as a continual process and
must be a program priority.
Acquisition managers must maintain an in-depth knowledge
of what is happening in the environment and become aware of
the important trends that might affect Army acquisition
programs. Successful achievement of acquisition goals and
objectives can be accomplished, if the Army is able to see
through the complexities and align itself well with the
environment.
B. SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED
A summary of the specific lessons learned from a review
of the ASM Program is provided below. Although many
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insights stem from traditional management techniques,
consideration and adherence to these lessons should assist
Army leaders and acquisition managers to better control and
responde to the ever changing acquisition environment.
• Lesson Learned #1: Justify Systems According to
Requirements and/or capabilities,
Not One-Dimensional Threats.
• Lesson Learned #2: Conduct Regular Threat
Reassessment and Revalidation.
• Lesson Learned #3: Understand the Nature of the
Congress and congressional
Interests.
• Lesson Learned #4: Abide By congressional Directives
and Mandates.
• Lesson Learned #5: Understand OSD's Political
Foundations.
• Lesson ~earned #6: Understand the underlying Meaning
of Acquisition/Procurement
Guidelines and Policies.
• Lesson Learned #7: Plan For unexpected, Unknown
Factors.
• Lesson Learned #8: Establish Periodic strategic
Reassessment Points.
• Lesson Learned #9: Ensure Mutually Supportive
Acquisition strategies.
• Lesson Learned #10: Repress organizational Paradigms.
• Lesson Learned #11: safeguard Key Program concepts
and Ideas.
• Lesson Learned #12: Focus on Program Ends Rather Than
specific Means.
• Lesson Learned #13: operational Planners and Material
Developers Must Comprehend
Political and Economic Realities.
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• Lesson Learned #14: Maintain Program Consensus.
• Lesson Learned #15: Instruct Acquisition Managers in
the Art of Political compromise.
c. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations have been derived from the
review and analysis of the ASM Program:
1. These lessons learned should be reviewed for
application in all current and future Army acquisition
programs.
2. Periodic programmatic reassessment of both internal
and external environmental factors should be conducted
to ensure that the program is aligned with valid
justifications and has the support necessary for
approval.
3. Acquisition managers should receive instruction in the
art of political negotiation and compromise in order
to successfully secure essential program objectives.
4. Further study is recommended into other programs for
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